Building the American Deportation Regime: Governmental Labor and the Infrastructure of Forced Removal in the Early Twentieth Century

ETHAN BLUE

In its early days no less than the present, transcontinental deportation from the United States involved extensive legal, administrative, and material government infrastructures. For modern states, tracking and moving people, records, and baggage across continental distances cheaply and under the auspices of the law demanded connections among multiple levels of government—municipal, state, federal, and international—and required new couplings between federal agents and private transport firms. Then as now, the US deportation regime drew together a host of disciplinary institutions: prisons and jails, hospitals and asylums, workhouses and welfare offices, and detention centers of all sorts. The deportation infrastructure produced a complex set of relations between institutions that were geographically dispersed. It also required workers—career employees and bureaucrats—to build and administer those systems.

In early 1914, United States immigration agents began using special deportation trains to remove unprecedented numbers of people from the country. The trains were a key component of a politico-technical assemblage that conjoined a host of security-oriented laws, agencies, and techniques and enabled and extended the will for an expansive means of national protection. The trains carried out nativist fantasies of immigrant exclusion and mass deportation and made their more perfect execution appear realizable. Immigration agents aboard these reconfigured railroad cars made constant circuits around the nation, gathering so-called undesirable aliens—people disdained for their poverty, political radicalism, criminal conviction, disability, or purported madness, all compounded by maligned national and ethno-racial difference—and conveyed them to ports for exile overseas. Previous deportation procedures had been locally administered, expensive, frequently violent, and relatively ad hoc. But between 1914 and 1945, the transcontinental railroad—perhaps the exemplary technology of industrial
modernity—facilitated the mass expulsion of the undesirable. This was the
deportation regime’s age of rail, followed in the postwar years by the ages of
automobility and air travel. Rail offered the state new technical capacities
to deport large numbers of people, or at least to make deportation a cred-
ible threat. Indeed, by mid-century, immigrant rights activists described the
“deportation terror” that roiled their communities.

Compared to the twenty-first century standards of mass deportation, the
numbers of people expelled in the first part of the twentieth century were
small, climbing from 1,630 in 1893 to 37,651 in 1914. Official removals
dipped during the war but grew in the first half of the 1920s (from 14,557
in 1920 to 36,693 in 1924), and averaged 31,851 in the second half of the
decade. Yet the significance of rail as a means of mass removal exceeded
the numbers of people expelled in any given year, because it offered a coor-
dinated governmental system with the flexibility to expand (or contract) in
response to political and economic conditions. In the century since the trains’
deployment, deportation has grown into a massive regime and flashpoint of
contemporary global racial political economics. Removal rates skyrocketed
under the Bush and Obama administrations, and in 2013 alone, 434,015
people were removed. President Trump’s supporters in 2016 saw this as far
too few, and lobbied hard for—and received—a far more punitive system.

Despite expanding research into deportation and the multiple branches
of the carceral state, few have deeply investigated the people whose lives
translated law into force and whose labor provided the logistical infrastruc-
tures that moved deportees’ bodies through space. Deportation agents, and
the infrastructures they operate, compress the time, space, and cost between
the interior spaces where so-called undesirable migrants were captured and
the borders beyond which they would be expelled.

Organized systems of forced movement in US history have ranged from
the catastrophe of Indian Removal to the brutal repopulation of colonized
spaces with enslaved workers, and they lend themselves to analysis that is as
capacious as the systems themselves. Deportation, too, can be understood
in the broad context of US settler colonialism, as an effort to determine
who was and was not permitted to be a settler. In the nineteenth-century
deportation regime, ordinary citizens in lynch mobs and salaried state
agents, be they at ports of entry or in the interior, concentrated on local or
regional policing. For more distant concerns, they relied on private transport
firm representatives to screen potential travelers. By the early twentieth
century, comprehensive assessment of the US deportation regime would
require analysis of the panoply of state, private, and civil society workers
involved in modern governance who drew local control and cathartic anti-immigrant violence into a modulated federal system: local police and state prison guards, welfare agents and county physicians, clerks in mental asylums, border patrol and customs agents, private railroad guards and porters, and federal employees who actually manned and staffed the Immigration Bureau’s transport divisions. The deepest analysis would involve the people who laid the rail on which the trains rode, or, more recently, those who build, service, and fuel the airplanes and busses on which people are removed. All of these people—and indeed, the systems they built and the materials they used—compose the United States deportation regime.

Although it is crucial to understand the extent of this regime’s insinuation throughout the national fabric and global space, this article’s ambitions are more limited. Drawing on rarely used federal personnel records from the St Louis branch of the National Archives and employing more traditional biographical methods, this article concentrates on Immigration agents who helped develop the practice of forced removal in the early twentieth century and the rise of the administrative state. Assessment of their working lives offers a history of the state not from *above* (the politicians and policymakers of traditional political history) or from *below* (those targeted, subordinated, or constituted by policy as told through New Social Histories of the state) or from *without* (such as experts, interest groups, private firms, or professional associations—as in work in new political histories and American Political Development), but rather, from *within* the administrative state.13 These are the people engaged in state praxis; their labor materializes the state through the enforcement of policy. Understanding the lives, perspectives, and experiences of bureaucrats is valuable historical work in itself. But is also useful for understanding of the effects of state (and para-state) formation in historical context, as well as its consequences for immigrant communities. Although this article does not examine deportees’ experience of forced removal (which others, myself among them, have explored elsewhere), it answers Brian Balogh’s 2003 call for political-administrative histories through the lesser bureaucrats who managed and enacted expulsion policy.14

Richard Taylor, Henry Weiss, Leo Russell, and Edwin Kline were each instrumental in developing the US deportation regime. Others played important roles, but these four men vitally helped to craft the operational practices of the United States’ first nationally coherent deportation system. The regime demanded workers whose practical skills were institutionalized in this mobile carceral network. They helped build efficient systems. They maintained knowledge and communication infrastructures. Even as the
federal regime absorbed the impetus of local anti-immigrant movements, they remained ready to use force. Theirs was a relentless, legally sanctioned system; a bureaucracy that proved more than the sum of its parts.

Early deportation agents, like most government workers at the time, were predominantly white and overwhelmingly male. Two of the four agents under consideration worked for the US military before or in the midst of their immigration work, revealing overlaps in staffing between domestic and international coercive state forces. One was a recent immigrant and naturalized citizen whose ambitions and linguistic talents were mobilized toward exclusion. Others were American-born, and if their skills were uneven, their unquestioned whiteness and manhood provided ample pedigree. White women also worked as matrons, translators, inspectors, and in the non-governmental institutions dedicated to the moral uplift and sometimes-coercive salvation of sex workers.15

Together, deportation agents’ stories reveal complex bases of US state power and processes through which abstract notions of governance-through-removal came into being. The United States’ modern, coordinated, national deportation regime, for all its fearsome impact in the twenty-first century, was not born fully developed. Human labor materialized the administrative state.

**STREAMLINING GOVERNANCE: THE SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT OF EXPULSION**

Despite the Chinese Exclusion Act and the general Immigration Act of 1882, and despite the Geary Act a decade later, American exclusionists’ visions of mass expulsion remained unfulfilled at the turn of the century. Funds were too few and the continental distances too great. Executive and legislative political will was pulled between the interests of racial exclusion and flows of capital. Moreover, Chinese defendants targeted by the Geary Act often successfully challenged debarment and deportation cases in federal courts.16

Departmental administrators could not address the diplomatic, political, or economic concerns that surrounded federal deportation, but they could search for ways to make it cheaper. In 1905, officials at the Department of Labor discussed the possibilities of coordinated deportation journeys to cut costs.17 Plans made little headway despite further discussion in 1910, 1911, and 1912. There were fiscal arguments for and against deporting aliens considered likely to become public charges (LPC), and controlling those with mental illnesses or disabilities was a driving force in the evolution of
the deportation regime. In 1910, for instance, Acting Secretary of Labor Benjamin S. Cable complained about delays in deporting aliens held at California’s Napa State Hospital, who, as public charges, cost the state money and therefore, he reasoned, should be immediately removed. In response, Commissioner-General Keefe told Cable that the cost of administering each deportation was also quite high and involved visits to state hospitals, transit fare, food arrangements, staff salary and time, and so on. The San Francisco office’s solution, for which it gained approval from Washington, was that they would deport immigrants deemed mentally unfit by the carload rather than singly.

There were other local and regional experiments, but nothing coalesced at the federal level until late 1913, when Los Angeles–based Immigrant Inspector Richard Taylor submitted a report on how to cut costs. Taylor, a dogged investigator, former naval cadet, and once a much-trusted bodyguard to Theodore Roosevelt, had been detailed from the US Secret Service to investigate misconduct in the federal government and extend civil service reform, professionalizing and modernizing its ranks. He joined the immigration bureau in 1907 to ferret out collusion in Chinese smuggling, but his interests ranged further. When Taylor turned to deportation traffic, he found common cause with other Progressive Era managers who thought government itself would benefit from a healthy dose of economic rationalism. Deportation journeys, he thought, needed “to be properly regulated.” Scientific manager Frederick Winslow Taylor developed time-and-motion studies to direct workers’ bodies on the shop floor; Inspector Taylor applied the same principles to government infrastructure and insisted that combining eastbound parties from Seattle, Portland, and San Francisco would eliminate wasteful movement. Compiling the numbers of agents and attendants, Pullman fees, railroad fare, and per diem expenses, Taylor calculated the costs of seventeen eastbound journeys in 1912 and 1913. In total, 143 people were deported at a cost of $17,781.22. Combining trips would cut costs by more than half.

Taylor discussed his plan with colleagues. Their principal opposition, he reported, was that the officers and attendants “would have lost the opportunity of making excursions to the East,” which they had understood as a job perk. His sense that agents were treating deportation journeys as vacations was heightened by officers’ tendency to hire their wives as attendants. Taylor had a point. Twelve of the trips he surveyed departing Seattle and San Francisco employed attendants who appeared to be the spouse of, or at least related to, the agent in charge. He accused officers of needlessly overstaffing the trips, including an instance where an officer in charge and
four attendants accompanied five aliens at a cost of over $1100, which, he noted, “seems almost incredulous.”24

Though much scholarship stresses the privatization of immigrant detention (and transport) as symptoms of neoliberal assumption of state practice, private firms have long been involved in immigration control.25 Taylor consulted with railroad passenger agents—experts in human transport—for their advice and services. Taylor decided that the Southern Pacific’s offer was the best and their logistical recommendations the most useful. The Southern Pacific’s agent proposed handling “all deports in a tourist kitchen car; originating the parties in Seattle and collecting the aliens in Portland and San Francisco and then East either via Ogden, Omaha and Chicago, which would enable deports from Salt Lake City, Denver, Chicago, and other intermediate points being attached thereto, with only the additional expense of transporting them to the main line points through which the car would pass.”26

The Southern Pacific’s agent suggested the most efficient routes. Travel would be a bit more convoluted and thus longer, but Taylor believed that it was well worth it; savings on labor would more than offset additional subsistence expense.

Beyond logistical expertise, the Southern Pacific also offered material and human capital, including an “attendant, ... cook, waiter and porter.” Taylor proposed a test run on January 12, 1914. A train would leave Seattle with six deportees and gather ten more in San Francisco before heading to Ellis Island.27

Despite considerable reliance on private train staff, ultimate responsibility rested with the Immigration Bureau, which would need to find officers to make and supervise the journeys. They found Inspector Henry Weiss, based out of Seattle. “Inspector Weiss,” Taylor noted, “is able to speak the language of practically every class of aliens apprehended in the country, including Chinese; in addition, he has several years’ experience as a tourist agent in the employ of the Cook & Sons Company.”28 Over the next few months, the department identified problems and opportunities in the system. Weiss was central to each turn of the wheel.

**Immigrant Inspectors: Henry Weiss and the Repressive State Apparatus**

In many respects, Henry Weiss was an ideal candidate to run the deportation trains. An immigrant himself, Weiss was born on January 24, 1866, in Istanbul, then called Constantinople, under the Sultanate of Turkey. He
was one of many first- or second-generation immigrants who dedicated their professional lives to immigration control. The United States, as a multicultural, settler-colonial state, hired people of different ethno-racial groups to serve as immigration agents, offering a bargain by which heterogeneous immigrants, drawn from the peripheries of America’s imperial and economic networks, could secure their own families’ freedoms by circumscribing others’. At Angel Island, Ellis Island, and along the nation’s borders, recent Chinese, Italian, and other immigrants or their children were tasked with regulating their erstwhile compatriots’ entry, exclusion, or as in Weiss’s case, removal. Fiorello La Guardia might be taken as an example of a child of immigrants who lobbied on immigrants’ behalf—even while working at Ellis Island—but others took more restrictionist turns. This dynamic persists. When Donald Trump invoked ICE special agent Celestino Martinez as a law-and-order hero in his 2018 State of the Union address, it was an attempt to inoculate his policies against charges of anti-Latinx racism. The national incorporation of ethnic Others for instrumental purposes of imperial border policing—into what Althusserians would call the repressive state apparatus—may draw on liberal-pluralist narratives, but it serves restrictionist ends of population control. For today’s borderland communities, it can do both at the same time.

Scant evidence remains about Weiss’s early life, family, religion, or upbringing. He spoke German at home, but also learned French, Spanish, Italian, and English, and acquired a more-than-passing familiarity with the Syrian, Hebrew, and Portuguese that would later so impress his superiors. The twenty-four-year-old Weiss arrived in San Francisco in 1890. He soon married, and his young family moved to New York City, where, in 1896, he was naturalized as a US citizen. None of the documents in Weiss’s personnel file point to his experiencing the ethno-racial or religious stigmatization that later and larger numbers of Ottoman immigrants, notably Syrians, would face, suggesting that officials considered Weiss’s German background to indicate relative if not full whiteness. Nor does it appear he faced the racial questioning, public scrutiny, or moral ambiguity confronting Chinese American immigration agents and brokers. His class, literacy, and new citizenship undoubtedly helped solidify his white racial status.

In New York, Weiss worked in numerous fields, including as a translator for Cook’s Tourist Agency—partially establishing his bona fides in facilitating passenger travel. In 1900, Weiss took a civil service exam for the US Government Printing Office. Three years later Weiss passed a competitive examination with high scores in French, Italian, and Spanish to translate for
the Immigration Bureau. Weiss swore an oath to enforce immigration laws and defend the Constitution. The oath mentioned the $1,200 salary he would earn, but as it paid homage to the state and nation with God as witness, the ritual symbolically linked Weiss’s belief systems (whatever they may have been), and intersectional subjectivities to enforcing state sovereignty.36 Weiss’s oath-taking also affirmed what political scientist Nicholas R. Parrillo identified as the utopian ideal of honorary service, in which governmental labor is understood beyond mere employment.37 For Weiss, it likely recalled his earlier oath upon becoming a citizen. The salary he earned solidified his professional allegiance to the state instead of applicants, petitioners, or subjects. Moreover, beyond material support, progression through pay grades offered Weiss recognition and social validation.38

As a new member of the Immigration bureaucracy, Weiss had little control over his professional fate. His superiors gave him about a week to move his family to Seattle. He also had to pay for his family’s relocation, which cost about a third of his salary.39 Two months later, he was transferred to Port Townsend, Washington, which required “a constant demand for [Weiss’s] services.”40

Weiss was ambitious; his hours were long and work difficult. In order to interview incoming seamen, he had to row a small boat through Port Townsend’s often rough weather, to board and depart heaving ships from a swinging rope ladder. He was injured at work but continued his labors. In addition to responsibilities as a translator, he became Port Townsend’s acting Immigrant Inspector. Supervisors recommended him for promotion, but for unclear reasons, it was denied.41

Weiss’s professional break finally came in 1912, when he was assigned to tour Oregon’s insane asylums in search of deportable aliens. According to the Commissioner of the Portland office, “Inspector Weiss, by virtue of his linguistic ability and general experience in this character of work, is more highly qualified to conduct such an inquiry than is any employee connected with this station. In fact, there is no one in this office who has all the necessary qualifications.”42 Weiss found twelve people to be removed immediately and a dozen more who bore further investigation.43 In addition to screening for the supposedly mentally unfit, Weiss was no stranger to ethno-racial or class disdain. This, too, likely helped secure his bureau bona fides. After one interrogation conducted in Italian, he described the prisoner as “the usual Southern Italian laboring type” who “made a decidedly unfavorable impression.” He recommended deportation at the shipping firm’s expense.44
Sifting through corrective and disciplinary institutions became central to the practices of national inclusion, incorporation, discipline, and deportation. The 1907 Immigration Act provided legislative direction for the Department of Labor’s increased federal scrutiny and developed what might be considered a more coherent federal apparatus of capture for deportable peoples. The legislation accorded with locally driven efforts by institutional administrators to rid themselves of the migrants on whom they felt they wasted resources.\textsuperscript{45} Federal immigration agents would sweep “penal, reformatory, and charitable institutions”—both public and private—in their districts.\textsuperscript{46} Each regional immigration station was directed to conduct investigations into potential deportees. Federal officials hoped that the connections they made with state and local penal, medical, and welfare officers would form a net to capture the undesirable. The tighter the net was woven, the more effective it would be, but this required much work and was not always successful. Federal agents began visiting institutions in 1908, and many left standing requests that they be notified of the arrival of any non-citizens. The sweeps were successful “for a short while.” But the Commissioner-General of Immigration would complain that these institutions’ weak memories (worsened by turnover in their politically appointed staff) limited the likelihood of their contacting the Immigration Bureau. As a result, “the practice of reporting new cases soon fell into disuse,” and, despite similar requirements written into the 1917 Immigration Act, the Commissioner reported that there were too few visits to public institutions between 1908 and 1923.\textsuperscript{47} In the years to come, imperfect coordination among disparate carceral sites frustrated restrictionist officials, Red Squad adherents, and anti-immigrant politicians, prompting new community surveillance and governmental communication infrastructures—but also protest from immigrant communities and their supporters.\textsuperscript{48}

Nonetheless, in 1913, Henry Weiss was doing his part. His effectiveness scouring Oregon’s asylums drew his superiors’ attention in Washington, DC. They soon tasked him with investigating conditions on Hamburg American and North German Lloyd Line steamers.\textsuperscript{49} He would accompany an immigrant removed from the West Coast and across the continent and then the Atlantic Ocean to Europe; the journey would serve as an institutional test case for the removal process. The letter also asked Ellis Island to hold potential deportees until Weiss arrived, so that he could oversee their removal, too.

Once on board the steamship, Weiss’s primary mission was to survey the ship-board systems and conditions, ascertaining the best practices in
forced removal from the shippers’ expertise. To that end, Weiss, as a state agent, acquired new professional, administrative, and logistical knowledge in developing a federal deportation infrastructure. Moreover, he would evaluate whether or not the quality of care accorded with US sensibilities of decent treatment for the mentally unwell.

Shortly thereafter, Inspector Taylor proposed that Weiss oversee the trans-continental deportation trains. While ethnically identified agents might be expected to focus on communities with whom (superiors believed) they shared an ethno-racial identity, Weiss’s relative whiteness, and particularly his multi-lingualism, became central in his own relative incorporation as a state agent capable of deporting a host of different peoples. His linguistic skills shifted his own foreign birth from a stigmatized difference to an instrumental means of belonging. Weiss, moreover, was consistently accommodating to his superiors, even when trains were understaffed and working conditions were difficult. By April 1914, he was appointed as Chief Deportation Officer, and Commissioner Caminetti tasked him to “take charge of all deportation parties from Pacific Coast points” and convey them to the eastern seaboard. Caminetti explained that “When it is decided by the Bureau to start a party of deportees, telegraphic instructions will be given to that effect, and it will thereupon become your duty to take charge of the details.” Weiss would “inform the Bureau by telegraph at the time of starting from the initial point, indicating in every case what time the party is scheduled to reach Chicago and stating the number of aliens from Pacific Coast ports. You will also notify the officers in charge at Denver, Colorado, and Helena, Montana, as to the scheduled time of passing through the most convenient junction points in or near those districts, in order that deportees, whose cases are being handled by those offices, may be added to the party if possible. The Bureau will notify the Chicago office in each case and the latter will give the necessary notification to the Inspectors in Charge at Minneapolis, St. Louis, and points east of Chicago.”

Moreover, Weiss would now bring Chinese deportees who had been captured on the eastern seaboard and interior to the West Coast, thereby saving on westbound transport, too. This enabled the deportation agent’s nearly constant working travel. The Bureau would not need to pay him to return empty-handed, and deportees he oversaw traveling west ensured the state would bear no empty freight return costs.

With the letter, Henry Weiss, a forty-eight-year old, multi-lingual, Turkish-born naturalized citizen, became the first chief deportation agent, charged with enacting a federally coherent deportation system. He no longer
sought to identify or capture undesirable aliens, but rather, to oversee their extraction from the nation’s interior and thereby make deportation policy real. The job was a considerable promotion with new responsibilities and a significant pay raise. The position required extended periods away from his family. He rode the trains nearly continuously.

Weiss’s career came to an abrupt end two years later. In July 1916, he fell ill near Denver aboard the train. He had previously worked through injury and continued without medical attention. It was perhaps ironic that one of Weiss’s first tasks in developing the deportation regime had been to assess medical conditions available in transit. Yet here, the state did not (on this occasion, at least) provide medical care. Weiss was hospitalized when the train arrived in Chicago. A perforation in his small intestine had led to general peritonitis. His wife left Seattle to be with him, but he died before she arrived.

Seattle’s Commissioner Sargent, with whom Weiss had worked for many years, lobbied for the Bureau to pay for Weiss’s medical costs and the return of his body. The requests were denied. The Nickel Plate Railroad’s passenger agent extended professional courtesy to the man with whom his firm had worked over the past two years, and gave his body free passage on this final journey from Chicago to San Francisco, where he would be buried.56

Weiss’s daughter, Dorothy, accused the Bureau of working her father to death. “There is not a doubt but what his premature death at the age of fifty, was due to the fact of his continuous travelling for the government,” she fumed. Her father’s “sense of duty . . . was so omnipotent that he truly gave his life up for it.” The family’s mourning was compounded by financial distress, and Dorothy begged for the Bureau’s help. Weiss’s two youngest children were still in school. His wife was unwell. Dorothy was “practically the only visible means of support for the family.” Dorothy Weiss was, in essence, informing the Immigration Bureau that her father’s death threatened to make them into public charges, like so many aboard her father’s trains. Her appeal for governmental support sounded a familiar refrain and met a predictable response.57 No funds would be forthcoming. According to the Acting Commissioner General, nothing had “been appropriated by Congress for defraying expenses of that kind.” He regretted that he could make no changes “as a matter of sentiment.”58 Bureaucracy was unforgiving, and his hands were tied. Even the people who made the regime were subjected to it. Henry Weiss died as a cog in the machine he helped build. But the machine worked. From 1914 through the year of his death, 85,974 people were officially removed from the United States.59
CLERK ASCENDANT: LEO RUSSELL
AND INFORMATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURES

Two weeks after Weiss’s death, Leo Russell was assigned to transport a group of pending deportees from Seattle to New York. Though he would meet officials in San Francisco to learn the deportation procedures that Weiss had helped develop, Russell was no Bureau neophyte and had been quickly ascending its ranks. Russell knew Washington well. He was born there in 1884, and his father worked as a printing officer and stenographer for the government. Leo and his brother would both follow their father into government service. Russell attended two years of high school and the Temple Shorthand School, understanding, perhaps at his father’s urging, that this writing technology could help him in government or other kinds of administrative work. The utilitarian efficiencies that shorthand promised—condensing time and space for the transfer of knowledge—underscored, even at this early age, the basis of his career as an immigration agent. Such communicational efficiencies were crucial to the deportation regime’s nascent informational infrastructure.

Still, for Leo Russell, that was some time away. He first worked for the Navy as a messenger boy, and later, a stenographer and copyist. In late 1906, Russell began work as a copyist and clerk in the Immigration Bureau’s Secretary’s Office, and worked his way up pay grades. By 1909, Russell’s duties as clerk were increasingly complex. According to a supervisor’s report, Russell’s responsibilities involved arranging “correspondence topically in proper files and assist[ing] in preparing name index therefrom. Work requires accuracy and some familiarity with subject-matter.”

At first glance, indexing and filing correspondence seems mundane to the point of insignificance. But it was, and continues to be, crucial to the creation and maintenance of the deportation regime. It involved organizing sustainable and accessible interpersonal and administrative networks; a mode of information management akin to the filing system invented in 1883 by French bureaucrat Alfonse Bertillon. Russell’s job as a correspondence clerk was vital in the creation of institutional memory and indispensable to developing knowledge infrastructures and communicative networks. The systems he developed strengthened bureaucracies and connected governmental departments and facilitated their interactions with citizens, applicants, and non-governmental agencies. His was an informational network at the heart of what legal historian William Novak, following Michael Mann, would call infrastructural power.
Russell acquired new responsibilities and earned excellent efficiency ratings. He soon took on a supervisory role extending the correspondence filing system. By 1911 Russell oversaw seven other clerks. That same year, Russell was told to report to Portland, Oregon, to convey three men from Oregon to the Atlantic seaboard for deportation. It was his first time working as a short-term deportation officer, but it was far from the last. He made another trip as a deportation officer to Cleveland in November 1912, and again to Norfolk, Virginia, in 1915, when he would accompany an insane seaman to New York.

After Henry Weiss’s death in 1916, Russell took over as deportation agent, adding to his profile as a bureau wunderkind. He soon supervised a dozen people, and in addition to being “in charge of deportation parties east and west,” was Chief of the Mail and Files Division. When World War I began, he joined the Bureau of Naval Intelligence—his wartime work again revealing circulation between ostensibly distinct military and civilian fields. Records do not reveal how his talents applied to Naval Intelligence, or if his specialist knowledge of infrastructures contributed to overseas warfighting or domestic counterinsurgency, but we do know he helped to improve its filing systems. Indeed, the Director of Naval Intelligence stressed that Russell’s help in “revis[ing] our filing and index system” was “a vital part” of their wartime mission.

After the war, Russell returned to the Immigration Bureau with new titles and experience. He remained in charge of Mail and Filing, but also was the official Chief of the Transportation Bureau, which involved planning and administering deportation parties. He lobbied for more money for his department, as any bureaucrat would, but also because he truly believed in its mission. “Immigration to the United States has been of the lowest type,” he wrote, “and it is presumed that many of these aliens will become public charges.” He celebrated his department’s success in having eliminated the aliens who had accumulated during the war, but further noted that there had not been an entire “cleaning out of all institutions . . . for ten years.” There was more work to be done.

Russell remained involved in deportation and transportation work from 1921 through 1924, but in a supervisory role that allowed room for other responsibilities. In 1922, Russell oversaw the Chicago Office when its acting Inspector in Charge was absent. He again engaged his passion for filing, having found that Chicago’s organizational system was in “an awful state.” That each regional office maintained its own record-keeping system (or did not, as seems to have been the case) speaks to how agents
like Russell contributed to the national deportation regime’s infrastructural solidification.

In 1924, Russell resumed control as Inspector in Charge of the Transportation and Deportation Division. Russell was expected to master the nuances of immigration law and acquire thorough knowledge of shipping facilities. According to the job description, the agents in the role were required to oversee “the deportation of all aliens ordered expelled from the United States. This work involves the forming of Trans-alantic [sic] and Trans-pacific deportation parties; the issuance of the necessary passports for each alien deported. More or less continuous supervision is necessary not only to keep the different parts of the deportation process in motion but also to see that the work is accomplished in the most economical and efficient manner.”

In November 1924, Russell applied for promotion again. He touted his accomplishments across portfolios and stressed the efficiencies he had developed, particularly noting the “[l]arge savings of funds . . . in connection with the deportation of aliens.” In November 1924, he became Assistant to the Commissioner-General. He led the Correspondence Division, the Division of Transportation and Deportation, the Mail and Files Division, and the Information Division. Each required a considerable degree of logistical planning and the coordinated flows of information and people.

Nevertheless, the labors took their toll. In July 1925, at the age of 41, Russell retired from the Department of Immigration. Perhaps it was exhaustion, driven by the demand of overseeing the removal of nearly 35,000 people in 1925, as just one element of his work; perhaps it was something else. Five years later, Leo Russell died. Henry Weiss’s family received little from the Bureau after his death. Leo Russell’s former colleagues sent flowers. From 1917 until the year Russell stepped down, 185,228 people were officially removed from the United States.

NEPOTISM AND FAILING UPWARD:
THE UNREMARKABLE WHITENESS OF EDWIN KLINE

Henry Weiss and Leo Russell each displayed considerable talent. Weiss’s global cosmopolitanism and Russell’s organizational skills contributed essential labor for developing the US federal deportation infrastructure. Edwin M. Kline worked on the Immigration Service’s deportation trains from 1919 until his retirement in 1946, but beyond his longevity and persistence, he seemed a generally unremarkable man. Kline’s career demonstrated the upward mobility of white male mediocrity in this branch of the
carceral state. Still, he had talent of a sort. He was a persistent white man who worked within state systems for personal advantage. He showed some political acumen in creating social networks among state agents, even if he alienated colleagues. His ascendancy also signaled the Bureau’s tendency toward hiring more “old stock” Americans, as characterized by the recurrent tenure and attitudes of Ellis Island Commissioner William Williams, rather than supporting the advancement of upwardly mobile immigrants like Weiss, who might have more liberal tendencies. Yet Kline was also different than agents based in the Southwest, whose roots and allegiances tended to sit deeper in borderland soil—and violence—than his own East Coast origins, “old stock” or no. In this, he was closer to the Bureau’s increasingly professionalized staff, holding greater loyalties to Washington’s national reach than to border networks. In either case, unlike Weiss or even Leo Russell, Edwin Kline simply didn’t die. Men like this helped sustain the deportation regime across the period of rail, and, one suspects, beyond.

Born in Washington, DC in 1876, Kline had some early general and mechanical education, but attended neither high school nor university. His father was a clerk at the Treasury Department and his brother was a messenger for the Department of Agriculture. Like Leo Russell, Kline’s whiteness was unquestioned and seemed to confer a sense of entitlement. He foundered until 1898, when the twenty-two-year-old landed an entry-level job as printer’s helper at the Treasury Department. Kline was too old to be eligible for the position, but his father successfully pushed to get him the apprenticeship. It was not an uncontroversial decision. Some noted the bureaucratic irregularities—they were too politic to call it nepotism—from which the younger Kline benefitted. He gained incremental promotions, including a four-month stint in 1904 in which he helped assemble and exhibit the Department of Commerce and Labor’s display at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition. In 1906 Kline was transferred to the US Coast and Geodetic Survey (USCGS), producing highly detailed maps of US territory. He shifted between bureaus and departments in his twenties. Supervisors’ reports were solid but, as had been the case with Henry Weiss, Kline’s salary remained stable. Unlike Weiss, Kline found other ways to get ahead. In 1909, his uncle contacted his senator to lobby on his nephew’s behalf, who, in turn, suggested that Kline be promoted. He was.

Kline returned to the USCGS but sought work outside the agency. His USCGS supervisor went to remarkable lengths to find Kline a job—elsewhere. Few agencies were interested, and those with vacancies explained that Kline was unqualified. The Bureau of Corporations Commissioner
was unimpressed, calling Kline “hardly . . . the type of man for a clerical position.” The Census Bureau did have an opening, but Kline would need to take the Civil Service examination. When he did, he scored 62.85, well short of the required 70. Once more, one of Kline’s senior administrator allies threw his weight behind the application, firmly but officiously quoting precedent and a 1907 executive order that gave the Census Bureau Commissioner discretion to waive applicant examination scores. It is hard to know what, if anything, took place behind the letters, but Kline retook the civil service exam. This time, he passed—with what might strike some as the frankly suspicious score of 70.05—just .05 above the minimum required. In May 1914, Kline began work for the Bureau of the Census. He appears to have done this with reasonable success but earned the enmity of at least one colleague. Michael F. Mullen, whom Kline supervised, accused Kline of anti-Catholic bigotry, flagrant abuses of power, exploiting the labor of the people he supervised, and accepting bribes from those he interviewed. The same colleague accused Kline of being secretly Jewish, too.

Two years later, Kline took a junior clerk position in the Immigration Bureau. He had applied for a promotion at the Census Bureau just weeks beforehand. His supervisor did not support the promotion, but it still went ahead. Managers might not have advocated for his promotion, but they absolutely supported his transfer. Moreover, his arrival came shortly after Anthony Caminetti’s appointment as Commissioner-General of Immigration and signaled an entrenchment of revanchist hires.

If we look at three points of Kline’s pre–Immigration Bureau governmental labor—the Census, the Coastal Survey, and remarkably, if briefly, preparing displays for the 1904 Louisiana Purchase Exposition—we can understand him as a minor and perhaps burdensome functionary in the bureaucratic production of knowledge about US territory, economy, and population. Kline may have been a man of middling talents, and boosted by nepotism and whiteness, but he contributed quite literally to the production of maps, censuses, and museums, all essential technologies in the making of modern nations.

Kline was forty years old when he began at the Department of Labor. He transferred to the New York City office, where he worked in cooperation with the New York City Public Employment Bureau. Despite indications that Kline’s career was built on nepotism, he evaluated migrants’ opportunities for work based on merit, directed them to employers, and kept detailed records in their cases. Supervisors said he was good at this, at least, and Kline was soon promoted from junior clerk to clerk.
The First World War proved a boon to Kline’s career. In December 1917, he took temporary leave to join the War Emergency Employment Service, where his experience linking people with vacant jobs put him in good stead. He enjoyed a meteoric rise during the war, and was promoted to Senior Examiner at the Washington, DC branch, and then Federal Director of the US Employment Service in September 1918. Professionally, at least, Kline must have been sad to see the war’s end. He returned to the Immigration Service in late 1919 as a junior clerk in the Baltimore office, earning less than he had during the war. He began a slow rise in the Bureau, and was promoted to clerk in late 1920. Leo Russell, in charge of the Transportation and Deportation Division, served as notary witnessing Kline’s Oath of Office. Their careers were converging. By 1920, Kline was thoroughly involved with the deportation parties. In this, he found his calling. Dr. Leo L. Stanley, the San Quentin–based physician who occasionally provided medical services aboard the deportation trains (the bureau may have learned a lesson from Henry Weiss’s death) described Kline as “a man of the highest integrity and capabilities . . . thoroughly competent and qualified to handle the class of people who come under his care.”

As of July 1924, Kline became Principal Clerk (Deporting Officer) in the Bureau of Immigration. He still worked under Russell, but not for much longer, as Russell was soon to retire. According to Kline’s formal job description, he was “In charge of . . . conducting alien deportation parties . . . between New York and San Francisco, . . . conveyed in car-lot groups to the west coast and east coast for delivery aboard ships for deportation to Asiatic and European countries, respectively. These parties are sent through on an average once every five or six-weeks period, the round trip occupying about one month.”

The position required “thorough knowledge of transportation facilities; ability to maintain discipline among guards and aliens attached to deportation parties [as well as] Familiarity with the accounting system of the Immigration Service.”

He was soon promoted to Immigrant Inspector. As a deportation officer, Kline’s career stabilized. Controlling people’s movement through space made sense to him. He developed an understanding of the practices, the risks and opportunities of the work, and the front-line sensibility attributed to prison guards and police about how to read their subjects’ desperation, dangerousness, or quiescence. Kline continued to lead the deportation parties through the 1930s. He was promoted accordingly. Word spread. Indeed,
a trainload of deportees became known within the administration as a “Kline Party.” Today, National Archives online records note that these “groups were dubbed ‘Kline parties,’ after Deporting Officer Edward M. Kline who was in charge of this procedure.”

Still, the distinction between the federally administered deportation regime in which Kline worked, and the mass deportation and “repatriation” of ethnic Mexicans early in the 1930s, which took place in the midst of his career, is illustrative of both changes and continuities in US deportation and racial practice. Federal Kline parties aimed to be as regular as clockwork—running every five or six weeks—but the anti-Mexican mass deportation drives following the 1931 La Placita raid in Los Angeles are better understood as locally driven episodic and spasmodic expulsion rather than a clockwork machine. The 1931 deportations were a white racist social movement sparked by economic crisis, demanding anti-Mexican ethnic cleansing, driven by a white civil society mobilized by the Depression. The exodus from around the nation—which included elements of so-called self-deportation, too, from Seattle to Pittsburgh and all points South—was enabled by a patchwork of state, municipal, and private concerns and included state welfare offices, religious charities, and transport companies offering reduced fares. Rather than this cataclysmic expulsion, the Kline parties signaled the administrative state’s sustenance, all the more durable because of its banal institutionalization. After all, liberals stood on firm ground when they charged the 1919 Red Raids as representing a kind of delirium, as did Louis Post, or the 1931 raids and removals as unbecoming of a liberal-democracy. Instead, the train administration reflected “good governance” in the sense of mundane national protection. Its form of removal was a grinding, quotidian, state practice, and in line with the rule of law, supported by liberals and conservatives alike. It sublimated (partially) white catharsis through expulsion. The violent spasms and the banal procedural forms of removal have never been entirely exclusive; they reflect tensions between different tactics of national control.

When the Second World War began, the trains, which had been used to expel so-called undesirable aliens from the nation’s interior to beyond its borders, reversed their journey. They carried so-called enemy aliens to concentration camps, far from both co-ethnic communities and strategically vulnerable ports and borders, deep in the national interior. Kline was celebrated again: “Mr. Kline has conducted in a most efficient manner the deportation parties of the Service as well as enemy alien train movements.” War, once again, was a boon to his career. He was given a raise and
promoted to Inspector in Charge at the Baltimore office.\textsuperscript{118} In September 1946, Edwin Kline, now seventy years old, retired from the Bureau.\textsuperscript{119} Kline was feted by colleagues, admired for his longevity, and renowned for never having “lost a deportee.”\textsuperscript{120} Still, members of immigrant communities torn asunder by the Kline parties saw him in a harsher light. Journalist Willis Thornton reported that “Kline’s Deportation Party [was] a Grim Affair.” According to Thornton, Kline’s “party” of fifty-nine men and women were locked in the barred train cars for more than a week and “dumped in New York, where, willingly or not, they were to leave for their homelands.” A few had committed crimes, a few had jumped ship without papers, and some volunteered to return to their homelands. Many, he said, “told a similar story of failure . . . in which initial success had been followed by disaster—they had been cheated, their savings stolen, their little store burned, their strong arms weakened by age.” Along with a “decent young Welshman” and his American-born son, Thornton noted a “weatherbeaten old Bulgarian” who kissed his daughter before boarding the train. “Just before the door banged shut his gnarled fingers gestured an uncertain good-by to his daughter and to America[,] the America those hands, so warped and knotty, had helped to build.” Thornton had an eye for the individual story, but marveled at the scale of removal. The train he rode had fifty-nine people aboard. Others, he remarked, were much larger—with twenty-two cars filled, and carrying six hundred or more deportees.\textsuperscript{121} From 1925, when Kline assumed control of the trains, to his retirement in 1946, the United States officially removed 427,751 people—a number that did not include the anti-Mexican deportation drives.\textsuperscript{122} Kline’s trains may have been efficient, Thornton understood, but their human costs were high.

* * *

What can we glean of the deportation regime and this branch of the administrative state if we look at the careers of Richard Taylor, Henry Weiss, Leo Russell, and Edwin Kline, four federal employees who made it run? Firstly, attention to these men’s lives pulls back the curtain on the state and the deportation regime as an abstraction and its procedures as part of an inevitable disciplinary bureaucracy. The deportation infrastructure, with its dense, wide-ranging, and powerfully networked (if never seamless) connections, was built by specific and very human people. Once materialized, it was greater than themselves. Their logistical work of record-keeping, planning movement, and ensuring that the trains ran more or less on time, was vital to the administrative control of non-citizens and expulsion of so-called
undesirable peoples from the nation. It bound together distant branches of
the carceral state into a coherent federal system for removal.

While Taylor was a dogged investigator and scientific manager rooting
out corruption and inefficiency, Weiss labored relentlessly to weave himself
into American life. He strove to become an upwardly mobile immigrant
whose work for the Bureau would demonstrate to himself, others, and his
superiors the validity of his belonging in the United States. Weiss’s linguis-
tic expertise, his experience as a travel agent, and his ambition to please
supervisors like Taylor made him an excellent deportation agent, even as
his requests for career advancement were stymied—possibly because he
was himself an immigrant. Nevertheless, his language skills allowed him to
communicate with many of the people forced onto the trains; his ability to
respond in their languages, while ensuring that they did not escape, helped
the trains run more smoothly. From 1914 until his death, Weiss became the
on-board face of the deportation regime.

Leo Russell had none of Weiss’s language skills, but he was highly skilled
in developing systems to organize, access, and communicate knowledge at
institutional scales. Indexing knowledge from correspondence—commu-
nication within and among growing, complex, and disparate government
departments, and across continental distances—is at the core of modern
state systems. His expertise was in informational and material logistics.
Russell quickly ascended professional ladders in the Immigration Bureau
and added numerous folders to his managerial portfolio.

Edwin Kline, like Russell, was a white male, born into a government
family in Washington, DC. For much of his adult life, Kline showed himself
to be not particularly talented. Whereas Weiss over-performed his duties
to meet little and late reward, Kline benefitted from nepotism and frankly
dubious moments of promotion and lateral advancement across the federal
government. After an early career best described as failing upward, his pro-
fessional break came in World War I, when, though he had scarcely earned
a job, he began shaping immigrants’ career paths. After the war’s end, his
position as deportation agent suited him. By the 1920s, and thanks to Weiss
and Russell, this mediocre but persistent white man inherited a relatively
well-developed machine. He rode the trains as a prison administrator and
guard for the next twenty-five years.

The deportation apparatus that emerged over the century since the train’s
development was built by many hands. As Cold War anticommunism and
counterinsurgencies bled into an evolving nexus of criminal and immigra-
tion law late in the century, others would oversee a shift from deportation’s
era of rail and steamship to today’s removal by air and automobile. Rather than the trains’ east-west circuit, removal came to follow a consistently southerly vector, expelling people from Latin America. Still, these men’s portraits offer a glimpse into a much larger assemblage and reveal much of what would come: immigrants or their children who found professional security and respect by policing other immigrants; US-born bureaucrats whose talent or ineptitude nonetheless exercised governmental sovereignty and coercive force across national territories. They regulated the population by race, by politics, through invocation of criminality, or by mental or physical abilities. The bureaucracy they helped develop would grow under both Democratic and Republican administrations, subjecting migrants to new forms of capture, detention, and expulsion.

In our own period of deindustrialization, mass incarceration, accelerated global migration, reactionary nativism, and mounting inequalities, the state and the private firms that constitute a repressive border and immigrant policing regime promise an appealing career among limited choices, a career whose purpose is, in large measure, to restrict racialized non-citizens from accessing the opportunities that remain. The massive, formal regime coincides with rising rhetoric that dehumanizes migrants of color and radically extends the crisis-driven eliminatory, indeed celebratory, desire for cathartic expulsion, in unprecedented ways.123 Today’s deportation apparatus—with its integrated Secure Communities-style carceral data networks, its countless detention centers, its fleet of busses and airplanes; the agents who plan raids and kick down doors, operate computers, staff jails, and arrange travel—is the legacy of their work. And though the deportation infrastructure’s agents sought for it to operate smoothly and predictably, for those it captured and expelled, detention and removal were always—and have remained—chaotic, disorienting, terrifying, and haphazard; susceptible to uncertain administrative discretion, bureaucratic error, delays and accelerations, but also moments of subversion.124 Nevertheless, despite partisan debates and radical critiques in the twenty-first century over the nature or desirability of the regulatory and service-providing elements of the administrative state, the future of its repressive branch, for the time being, appears secure.

NOTES

The author would like to thank Chantel Rodriguez, Andrew Urban, and the anonymous reviewers from JAEH for their crucial feedback, as well as Jeff McArdle and Norah Piehl for fine production support. Lauren Catterson’s research assistance was invaluable; this
could not have been written without it. Thanks also to Claire Corbould, Ann Curthoys, Ned Curthoys, Andrea Gaynor, Cindy Hahamovitch, Tony Hughes D’Aeth, Shino Konishi, Dylan Lino, Alexandra Ludewig, Jeremy Martens, and Bill Taylor for comments on earlier drafts. Ethan Blue can be reached at ethan.blue@uwa.edu.au.


4. Rail was in relative decline as the dominant means of transport for the entirety of the US economy, but was coming into its own as a transcontinental system for removal.


17. Letter from F.H. Larned to B.N. Austin, B&O Railroad, April 20, 1905, 52903/60, RG 85, Entry 9, National Archives and Records Administration 1 (hereafter NARA 1).


19. See, for example, Letter from Cable to San Francisco Commissioner of Immigration (CI), March 26, 2010; Letter from Crawford to the Commissioner General (CG), March 23, 1910; correspondence between the San Francisco and the Washington, DC office, April 4, 1910; Letter from Keefe to Cable, April 6, 1910; Letter from Keefe to San Francisco office, March 23, 1911; also, letter from St Louis to CGI, December 23, 1912. 52903/60, NARA 1.


23. Letter from Taylor to CGI, December 22, 1913, 52903/60-A, RG 85, Entry 9, NARA 1.
24. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
33. Ottoman policy restricted the emigration of those who might become beggars in the Americas and damage Ottoman prestige. If Weiss’s travel was permitted, he and his family were at least middle class. Kemal H. Karpat. “The Ottoman Emigration to America, 1860–1914,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 17, no. 2 (1985), 177–179, 191.
35. Weiss Personal Question Sheet, Parts 1 and 2, filed May 31, 1904, NARA St Louis Dept of Labor (DoL) files; Letter from Larne to Sec Comm and Labor, December 4, 1906.
38. Parrillo, *Against the Profit Motive*.
39. Letter from Larned to Weiss, November 12, 1903, NARA St. Louis, Department of Justice (DoJ) files.
40. Letter from WB Estell to CGI, February 2, 1904, NARA St. Louis, DoJ.
41. Letter from Estell to CGI, June 23, 1905; Letter from Sargent to Estell, August 3 and December 1905, NARA St. Louis, DoJ.
42. Letter from Portland Commissioner to CGI, March 13, 1912, St Louis NARA, DoJ.
43. Letter from Bonham, Acting Inspector in Charge, to CGI, August 5, 1912, St Louis NARA, DoJ.
44. Hearing and Findings, Dominico di Stefano, aka Rossi, ND, 53775/263, RG 85, Entry 9, NARA 1.

46. “In re CO-OPERATION RECEIVED FROM OFFICIALS OF STATES, CITIES, MUNICIPALITIES, ETC., IN CONNECTION WITH THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE IMMIGRATION LAWS.” October 8, 1923 communication, 54951/Gen, RG 85, NARA 1.

47. Ibid.


49. Letter from Keefe to Immigration Service, Seattle, October 17, 1912, St Louis NARA DoJ.

50. Letter from Acting CG to CI, Ellis Island, October 18, 1912, St Louis NARA, DoJ.


52. Letter from Taylor, Los Angeles, to CI Seattle, February 3, 1914, 52903/60-A, NARA 1.

53. Letter from Caminetti to Weiss, April 22, 1914, St Louis NARA, DoJ.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Letter from Ebey to CGI, July 25, 1916; Letter from Caminetti to Chicago office, July 12, 1916; Letter from Sargent to CGI, July 14, 1916; Letter from Prentis to CGI, July 15, 1916; Letter from Sargent to CGI, July 21, 1916; Letter from Ebey to CGI, July 25, 1916; St Louis NARA, DoJ.

57. Letter from Dorothy Weiss to CGI, September 9, 1916, St Louis NARA, Weiss DoJ.

58. Letter from Acting CG to Dorothy Weiss, September 22, 1916, St Louis NARA, Weiss DoJ.


61. Personal Question Sheet, filed January 23, 1907, St Louis NARA Russell DoL.


63. Labor Dept Abstract of official Record of employee, April 23, 1924, St Louis NARA DoJ; Personal Question Sheet, filed January 23, 1907, St Louis NARA Russell DoL file.

64. Letter from Russell to Sec, Dept Comm & Labor, November 16, 1906; Certificate for transfer, January 5, 1907; Russell Oath of Office, January 22, 1907, in St Louis NARA Russell DoL; Efficiency Report, May 29, 1909, St Louis NARA, Russell DoJ file.


67. Efficiency Report, Undated, c. 1911; December 21, 1912 General Appointment—Fixed Date; Memorandum for Assistant Secretary, January 15, 1912, St Louis NARA, Russell DoJ.

68. Letter from CG to Russell, December 5, 1911, St Louis NARA, Russell DoJ.

69. Letter from CG to Russell, November 9, 1912; Letter from Morton to Immigration Bureau, February 18, 1915, St Louis NARA, Russell DoJ.

70. Efficiency Rating [undated, est. mid 1917]; July 1, 1917, Memorandum for Asst Secretary; General Appointment—Fixed Date, July 17, 1917. St Louis NARA, Russell DoJ.

72. Letter from Russell to CGI, November 22, 1918; Letter from Wells to CGI, December 16, 1918; Memorandum to Acting Sec Labor, December 28, 1918, St Louis NARA, Russell DoJ.

73. Letter from Wells to CGI, December 16, 1918, St Louis NARA, Russell DoJ.

74. Russell letter, June 15, 1921, 54933–351, RG 85, Entry 9, NARA 1.

75. Ibid.

76. Letter from CG to Russell, May 16, 1922, ; Letter from Russell to Mr Stusband, May 21, 1922, St Louis NARA, Russell DoJ.

77. Letter from Acting CG to Russell, April 25, 1924; July 1, 1924, General Appointment—Fixed date, St Louis NARA, Russell DoJ.

78. New Appointment Classification Sheet, July 1, 1924, St Louis NARA, Russell DoL.

79. Letter from Russell to Sec Labor, November 3, 1924, St Louis NARA, Russell DoJ.

80. Letter from CG to Sec Labor, Nov 15, 1924; Letter from Appointment Clerk to CGI, November 17, 1924; General Appointment—Fixed Date, November 18, 1924; CG to SecLabor, 16 Dec 1924; St Louis NARA, Russell DoJ.

81. November 14, 1924, Memorandum for Bureau Officials Concerned, St Louis NARA, Russell DoJ.

82. New Position and Change in Duties, Classification Sheet, November 16, 1924, St Louis NARA, Russell DoL.

83. Russell Career “Status” table, 1907–1925, St Louis NARA, Russell DoL.

84. DHS, 2015 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Table 39.

85. George C. Shaffer, Florist, Receipt, June 13, 1930. St Louis NARA, Russell DoJ.

86. DHS, 2015 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Table 39.

87. Cannato, American Passage, 193.

88. Personal Question Sheet, March 12, 1906, NARA St Louis, Kline Department of Commerce File (DoC).

89. Letter from Johnson to Sec Treasury, August 3, 1898, NARA St Louis, Kline DoC.

90. Letter from Director to Sec Treasury, October 27, 1899; Letter from Civil Service President to Sec Treasury, November 15, 1899; Letter from Johnson to Sec Treasury, November 18, 1899; all in NARA St Louis, Kline DoC.

91. Letter from Sec. Cortelyou to Kline, April 2, 1904, NARA St Louis, Kline DoC.


93. Letter from Andrews to McHarg, July 5, 1909, NARA St Louis, Kline DoC.

94. Letter from Kline to OH Tittmann, February 26, 1914; Letter from FW Perkins to Kline, March 2, 1914, in NARA St Louis, Kline DoC.

95. See letters from EF Sweet to various agencies, February 26, 1914, NARA St Louis, Kline DoC.
96. Letter from Commissioner Bureau of Corporations to Asst Secretary, March 16, 1914, NARA St Louis, Kline DoC.

97. Letter from Albert Lee Thurman, Acting Secretary, to “Gentlemen,” April 16, 1914; Letter from President, Civil Service Commission, to Sec Commerce, April 24, 1914, NARA St Louis, Kline DoC.


99. Letter from Mullen to WM Stewart, May 25, 1915, NARA St Louis, Kline DoC.

100. Letter from Chief Clerk to Farnum, May 8, 1916, NARA St Louis, Kline DoC.


103. DoL, Efficiency Rating of Departmental Employee, January 15, 1917, St Louis NARA DoJ.

104. General Appointment, DoL, 28 July 1917, St Louis NARA Kline DoJ.

105. Letter from Chief Clerk to “Sir” [Kline], January 12, 1918; DoL Oath of Office, January 7, 1918, St Louis NARA Kline DoJ; General Appointment—Fixed Date, March 2, 1918, St Louis NARA Kline DoJ; Letter from Asst Director General to Asst Sec Lab, May 23, 1918, St Louis NARA Kline DoJ; General Appointment—Fixed Date, June 1, 1918, St Louis NARA Kline DoJ; September 10, 1918 Change of Status blank; Letter from Acting Dir General, US Employment Service, to Sec Lab, September 16, 1918; General Appointment—Fixed Date, September 26, 1918, St Louis NARA Kline DoJ.

106. General Appointment—Fixed Date, May 26, 1919; 11 July 1919 General Appointment—Fixed Date, July 11, 1919; General Appointment—Fixed Date, July 24, 1919; Letter from Director General, US Employment Service to Sec Lab, July 11, 1919; Letter from Chief Clerk to “Sir” [Kline], October 18, 1919, St Louis NARA Kline DoJ.

107. Letter from CG Caminetti to SecLab, November 18, 1919; Oath of Office, November 18, 1919; Oath of Office, May 6, 1920; General Appointment—Fixed Term, April 22, 1920; General Appointment—Fixed Date, July 12, 1920; General Appointment—Fixed date, November 6, 1920. All in St Louis NARA Kline DoJ.


109. New Appointment Classification Sheet, July 1, 1924, St Louis NARA Kline DoJ.

110. Ibid.

111. Oath of Office, November 19, 1925, St Louis NARA Kline DoJ.


114. Blue, “From Lynch Mobs to the Deportation State,” esp. 14. This is not to suggest the federal government played no role at La Placita or in what followed or that local authorities were unimportant for the federal deportation apparatus via rail.


118. May 29, 1942, Dept. Justice Personnel Recommendation (Civil Service); Letter from Attorney General to Kline, May 29, 1942, St Louis NARA Kline DoJ.

119. Employee Service Record, St Louis, June 30, 1953, St Louis NARA Kline DoJ.


121. Ibid.


123. In May 2018, Georgia State Senator and Republican gubernatorial hopeful Michael Williams campaigned on a “deportation bus,” and promised to “fill this bus with illegals to send them back to where they came from. We’re not just going to track them and watch them roam around our state. We’re going to put them on this bus and send them home.” Fetishizing the deportation journey as spectacle was a successful publicity stunt by an unsuccessful candidate. https://williamsgeorgia.com/deportation-bus-tour/, accessed May 25, 2018.
