From Freudian narcissism to the Buddhist notion of *anatman*, via Jung’s idea of identity

François Martin-Vallas, *Grenoble, France*

(Translated by Ann Kutek)

Abstract: Starting from the question the youthful Carl Gustav pondered as he sat on ‘his’ stone – ‘Am I he who sits on the stone, or am I the stone on which he sits?’ – the author has attempted to show that, for Jung, the idea of identity is founded on a wilful non-determination. This stance results in ethical and methodological repercussions that differentiate it both from the Freudian project and from Hindu and Buddhist thought, while at the same time having much in common with them. The paper refers to the notions of emergence and (Varela et al. 1992) *enaction* and argues that the concept of the archetype, especially in relation to the self, merits a re-evaluation in light of the new scientific paradigm.

Keywords: identity, narcissism, Hinduism, Buddhism, archetype, self

Introduction: identity and ego

The reason I became interested in the Jungian take on the idea of identity comes from my reading of his autobiography, where he describes a childhood experience as follows.

He would often sit (alone) on a stone, his stone, and there he played an imaginary game that went something like this: *Am I the one who is sitting on the stone, or am I the stone on which he is sitting?* (Jung 1961, p. 35). I have

1 A version of this paper was first presented at the International Association for Analytical Psychology (IAAP) Congress, Kyoto, Japan, 28 August 2016 - 2 September 2016. The paper is also being published in French in *Revue de Psychologie Analytique*, winter 2016.

2 According to the Wikipedia entry, the introduction of the term ‘enaction’ is attributed to Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch (1992), who proposed the name to ‘emphasize the growing conviction that cognition is not the representation of a pre-given world by a pre-given mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs’.
pondered for a long time what this question could mean as it seems to indicate a deep unease with Jung’s sense of who he was. So as a medical doctor I have never had a problem with what another medical doctor, Winnicott (1964) asserted, namely that Jung had probably suffered from a childhood psychosis. But that is purely a medical model view which does not elucidate for us the why and wherefore behind this question.

His question could be put another way, like this: Am I he who perceives the world around me, or am I the world that he (I) perceives? This experience demonstrates a type of oscillation between the identity of the subject and that of the object of the perception. It amounts to saying that Cartesian dualism, that is, the separation between the observer and the thing (being) observed becomes erased. So the subject then is no longer merely the one who sees the world, he also becomes that world. Yet by the very act of enquiring into his identity, the subject, in this case the young Carl Gustav Jung, remains present as the subject of himself. That very experience distinguishes it from a frankly psychotic experience in the pathological meaning of the term.

I take this to have been the touchstone of Jung’s relationship to his self and, even more fundamentally, to his epistemology and to his ethics. By examining the relationship of the ego with the self, or of consciousness with the individual in his totality, he pressed it into the field of theory. Likewise, when he first wondered whether he could be the stone or the one sitting on it, he signalled a later problem – that of the subject in its relationship, as a conscious subject, with its totality. So, as he was sitting there meditating on his stone, he was pondering this as an experience, and not in the context of a Cartesian dualism which proposes that the reality of the object and that of the thinking subject should in essence be different from one another. Sitting there on his stone he was not a subject thinking about what he was experiencing in a kind of uncertainty as to his identity; he was himself rather a non-determined subject, a stone-child-thinker of a thought which was about his experience and not merely about his intellect, but about his cognition. Contrary to what I have just said, he had stumbled upon the first meaning of cogito³, which for those 17th century philosophers signified thinking emerging as much from bodily experience as from the mind.

Stemming from this identity conundrum, some people will obviously say that Jung was unable to arrive at a stable and well-defined identity position; Winnicott’s article would tend to support such a view. In my opinion, the incomprehension he met with and the later break from Freud are very probably profoundly rooted in this background. I am

moreover inclined to believe that Jung’s psyche was not so much caught in a neurosis but was more frankly psychotic, not in a pathological sense, but in the sense that he was able to maintain an ambiguous position as to his identity without ever losing his position as a subject. I consider that only the loss of personal subjectivity allows a diagnostic of psychosis. A similar attitude emerges in the writing of the French Freudian, Michel de M’Uzan:

How is it possible to escape the conclusion that the most authentic part of a being can only be discovered among the ‘psychotic’ foundations of his mind? … Added to which, it is necessary to distinguish the ‘psychotic’ from psychosis.

(de M’Uzan 2005, p. 26)

So as Michel de M’Uzan spells it out, the position I am advocating requires that there be no further confusion between the psychotic and psychosis and this means that psychotic processes should no longer be regarded as pathological. Such a distinction is essential for me in my theoretical reflections and even more so in my clinical attitude when listening to the words of my analysands and patients. Besides, we can find in Jung’s writing numerous references that distinguish psychotic processes from the pathological state that is psychosis. Examples would be when Jung examines the question of artistic creativity in the cases of James Joyce or Picasso (Jung 1934, para. 208). So when Jung talks about psychosis it is not about this or that psychic process, it is quite simply about the collapse of the ego’s capacity to differentiate and the loss of volition.

To return to the question of Jungian epistemology, it should be clear from the start that it is completely different from the Cartesian position. According to Descartes the concepts of res extensa and the res cogitans do not come from the same reality, they are different in essence. Only the first is applicable to the reality of a world obeying the rules of a time-space continuum, whereas the second, the res cogitans, is said to be by nature divine, thus for a believer like Descartes it paradoxically excludes the Creator from the very world He has created.

It was from these foundations that the youthful Jung set out on his medical studies and was naturally attracted by the then fashionable belief in vitalism. Vitalism, as we have been reminded by Ann Addison (2009), postulated that physical and psychic energy were one and indivisible, and therefore propounded an holistic approach to the reality of life. Another fashionable trend of the time, at the turn of the 20th century, was the vogue for the paranormal which also intrigued Jung and which I take to be part of the same movement. Fortuitously, just as in his childhood he eschewed the temptation of fleeing the world and looking for solace in death (Jung [1961, p. 9] wrote of strong suicidal ideation at that time) or in psychosis, when
he became a doctor he did not allow himself to be corralled by a more or less magical set of beliefs which would have turned him into an *illuminatus* or a kind of *guru*. He gives a striking example of this when he reports the case of a hysterical patient who would recover as though by magic whenever he induced in her a hypnotic trance, and who helped considerably, he tells us, to enhance his professional reputation (Jung 1961, p. 118). Yet, he also tells us that this experience with the patient led him to abandon hypnosis as a form of treatment, since he wanted to understand what was going on and could not be satisfied with a method dependent on apparently magical results. So just like the child sitting on his stone, it was not the outcome that interested him, only the underlying features of the experience. For me this was the hallmark of his professional life—indeed the attitude he was to adopt thereafter, which was an ethical position integral to his work and to the understanding of it and which also happens to be essential in our own clinical practice.

His ethical attitude is allied to his notion of the ego as the centre of consciousness. The ego as such should not be confused with consciousness and, in its role as the operating centre of consciousness, it should neither be confused with the subject in its totality. So if, for Jung, the ego as the centre of consciousness has to maintain a questioning stance towards all the thoughts and experiences it comes across or confronts, it could not have created itself as such. He describes this stance in a number of texts, for example in 1942 when he states: ‘The self, like the unconscious, is an a priori existent out of which the ego evolves. It is so to speak, an unconscious prefiguration of the ego. It is not I who create myself, rather I happen to myself’ (Jung 1942, para. 391).

We have here an emergent process of the subject’s identity, quite different from Freud’s proposed explanation of the ego. If we examine Freud’s standpoint, he sees the origin of the ego as the outcome of an expulsion, in fact a refusal by the subject to accept a part of itself, that is through repression. For Jung, by contrast, the ego comes about with the emergence of the subject to itself. It is a subject that is not born out of a refusal to exist but much more out of its enquiry into what it might be, whether it likes it or not. It is clear that both men recognize the necessity of an active position, one that affirms the subject as subject to itself, but the comparison stops there. The Freudian subject therefore asserts: ‘I am not, and I repress what I am not’, whereas the Jungian subject asserts: ‘Who am I?’ So whereas in Freud’s case the subject’s conscious refusal determines what it is not, thereby giving rise to the ego, in Jung’s case it is through the subject posing the question about itself that makes ‘him’ emerge from ‘himself’. To put it another way, Freudian metapsychology constructs a topography of the psyche with its ensuing complex dynamics. Jung’s theory, on the other hand, starts from the construction of complex dynamics that can never guarantee the emergence of a stable topography. This is why according to
Jungian thinking the subject’s identity remains always on the cusp of losing itself. Indeed, at certain crucial moments in the subject’s life that very option can become a necessity.

**Notions of emergence and enaction**

I have already referred to _emergence_ several times, without offering a definition of the term. It now becomes pertinent to do so in order to enlighten the many misunderstandings surrounding the Jungian idea of the archetype. This, by the way, is an idea that cannot be separated from the question of identity, since it is of course to the archetype of the self that Jung refers when he speaks about the emergence of the ego.

Historically, the notion of emergence first appears in the writings of 19th century British philosophers (notably George Henry Lewes 1875 and John Stuart Mill 1843) and it was a concept that rested on the observation that the totality is greater than the sum of its parts. That is to say that the study of a system by separating it into its constituent parts, followed by an examination of each of these constituents (a systematic procedure demanded by the scientific approach until quite recently), was in itself of limited value for those philosophers. In their eyes the properties of a global system could never be wholly deduced from the study of their constituent parts. Since then, the study of so-called complex systems in the field of physics in the 1960s and 1970s has strongly supported that earlier philosophical intuition, and the idea has become essential to the understanding of many systems in physics, biology and sociology. It is actually at the heart of the elaboration of several Jungian authors.

To illustrate what I mean, I will consider two simple examples that rely on very different data. The first of these concerns the three-dimensional organization of macro-molecules with enzyme-like properties. At its most basic, a macro-molecule is just a molecule made up of a collection of many elementary molecules. This collection depends on the properties of its constituent elementary molecules, such that their properties facilitate their coupling to one another as in a chain. If we look at this from a purely chemical angle, the collection creates a long molecular chain of elements, each attached to the next by chemical bonds, so that the chemical properties of the macro-molecule composed in this way should amount to the sum of all the chemical properties of its constituent molecules.

What we find in fact is that the molecules in this arrangement – and there could be several hundred of them – become arranged in a three-dimensional organization in the space of the chain, with new properties appearing as a result of the combination of their previous chemical and spatial properties. For example, an enzymatic property can emerge from the combination of simple molecules when separately they do not possess such a property.
Figure 1 represents a macro-molecular chain distorted under the effect of the chemical attraction created among certain of its constituent elements and its resulting enzymatic activity. This attraction and the ensuing reorganization demonstrate how a system can be self-organizing without the need for an earlier format, structure or any kind of prior planning to bring it about. Also, it should be noted that this self-organization has a retrospective effect on some of the constituents of the structure. For example, it may inhibit certain chemical properties in some of its elements that end up in the depths of the structure within the spatial organization of the macro-molecule, where there is no hope of their encountering a reagent.

An example such as this allows us to see that the notion of emergence is absolutely not magical but depends on the laws of physics and chemistry, although in such a system these laws do not lead to an occurrence of pure entropy that would just progressively disorganize the system. On the contrary, a system such as this one organizes itself so as to result in a newly emerged system with new properties.

One can use the same reasoning, for example, when we try to describe the emergence of the known universe out of a primordial soup or out of the ‘Big Bang’. It may be applied to the emergence of life out of the previously purely

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**Figure 1.** Emergence of enzymatic properties of a macromolecule.
inanimate organization of the original universe. Finally, we can also bring this approach to bear on explanations for the emergence of consciousness out of the global functioning of the human being, as has been noted already by a number of neuroscientists (e.g. Damasio 2000). Besides, it is clear to me that when Jung (1942, para. 391) comments: ‘It is not I who create myself, rather I happen to myself’, he is definitely referring to emergence, coupled with a further dimension that I shall develop here a bit later.

Before doing so, I wish to present a different type of emergence that occurs in the organization of some bird species while in flight, specifically in the case of starlings, which obey a set of rather straightforward rules⁴. All that is required of each individual is to stay in close proximity to his fellows, but not so close as to cause a collision. From this emerges a true group identity, both stable and fluctuating. What we observe in starlings in this YouTube film can also be observed in clouds of gnats. In cases illustrating aspects of animal ethology, as in the preceding example, the emergence of a new property is the outcome of auto-organization in the system created by the sum of numerous components or elementary systems. It seems to me that we have here a dual dynamic, dissociative and associative, from which can emerge, as here, an individuality of the set, which is simultaneously both stable and changing.

After this brief digression, I want to come back to Jung’s assertion: ‘I happen to myself’. It is the verb ‘to happen’ that interests me in this context since, as Elie Humbert (1983) noted, it is one of the three verbs essential to the understanding of Jung’s work, specifically to grasping the attitude he maintained towards himself.

The first of the trio of verbs is geschehen lassen that Humbert translated as laisser advenir in French, we might understand this in English as ‘to let it happen’. The second verb is betrachten, in French, considérer, engrosser, or in English ‘to observe’. The third expression is sich auseinandersetzen, in French se confronter avec, while in English it translates as ‘to confront with’ or ‘face up to’. Taken together we have here at once the observing subject, an active subject open to anything that could emerge from its observation, with the attitude of facing up to something which clearly affects both the observer and the thing(s) observed. So ‘to happen to oneself’ is in Jung’s terms not a stable state emerging out of the self, a completed identity; rather, it is like the entirety of a continuous process of transforming the subject, that is to say, in a constant movement of becoming who he is, an identity in the making, similar to the cloud of flying starlings that I have just referred to.

I consider this position of Jung’s to be very close to Francisco Varela et al.’s (1992) concept of enaction. Enaction is an idea that combines within a single

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⁴ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ctMty7av0jc (Smith 2011).
phenomenon the act of observation with the perception of the observed world. The premise here is that there is neither a pre-existing world prior to the act of the observer’s observation, nor a perception independent of the observer’s bias in enacting his observation. It follows that consciousness itself becomes an enaction of the subject, in that it is indissociable from the act of thinking that causes its emergence simultaneously with the emergent identity of the subject. Finally, the emergence of consciousness is obviously accompanied by the emergence of the unconscious, since both are inextricably linked to one another through their very existence.

This line of reasoning may seem somewhat strange to the contemporary Western mind-set, accustomed as it is to think in linear causal terms, or at least according to temporal linearity. This type of thinking that seems to arise spontaneously in the West appears to regard what emerges at a particular point in time as having had some sort of prior existence, at least as a schema, or, as Jung often said about the archetype, as a structure or a potentiality. Yet is this really a necessary proposition?

A short story may help us to understand this concept. It is the story of Nicolas, aged six, and Antoine, a sculptor. In the summer holidays, Nicolas went to stay with his grandparents in the country; one of their neighbours was Antoine. Nicolas had never really paid much attention to this solitary and sullen man until the day when a huge truck brought a great block of stone and unloaded it in Antoine’s front yard. Nicolas was riveted by the whole operation, which lasted an entire morning. In the following days, Antoine erected scaffolding around the block and began attacking it with noisy tools amid clouds of dust. However, the holidays came to an end – Nicolas had to return home and go back to school. His next visit was three months later and he arrived at dusk. Night fell and he had to wait till the next morning to find out, and maybe to understand, what Antoine had done with his block of stone. Having barely swallowed his breakfast, Nicolas dashed next door to Antoine’s and at the entrance was dumb-founded by what he saw. Where the granite block had stood before, there in the middle of the yard rose a magnificent horse! Antoine had got rid of the scaffolding and was polishing the horse. At this point, Nicolas took his courage in both hands and approached Antoine, to whom he had never dared to address a word, and asked him: ‘How did you know there was a horse locked up inside the stone?’

I love this story as it reminds us how often we can become trapped in the same naiveté as shown by Nicolas, imagining that what is revealed to us all of a sudden must have been there all along, like the magician’s rabbit popping out of his hat. Is this not the same, following Jung, as with the archetypes whose presence most of us do not doubt, and that we consider as pre-existing aspects of the psyche? In the story, the horse could only emerge through the efforts of the sculptor or rather through the action of the sculptor upon the stone, guiding, as it did, the sculptor’s approach; only
then did it become a horse in the gaze of little Nicolas. This I see as an example of enaction.

So if we follow Jung, or indeed if we follow his reasoning in the light of recent epistemological and scientific developments, my hypothesis is that we should perhaps abandon the notion of pre-existing archetypes. To do so does not, to my mind, in the least vitiate the value of the concept. The same would apply to the identity of the subject, which can then be envisaged as co-emerging with the act of consciousness itself.

Obviously, we are a million miles from the Freudian approach of a narcissistic construct viewed as a psychic envelope, or so it would seem. Yet, in fact, reverting a final time to Freud, his description of narcissism (Freud 1914) as of a libidinal investing in the subject’s own body, can also be envisaged as an enaction, since that investment is regarded as co-emergent with the representation of the body. It seems to me that there is a step missing in Freud’s theory, if only because there cannot be any auto-eroticism without the ‘auto’ part, that is without an already established narcissism. That is to say that a condition for the emergence of secondary narcissism would not be the pre-existence of a so-called primary narcissism, but the prior existence of secondary narcissism. This is a fine paradox, except when we consider that consciousness of one’s self and the auto-erotic investment in one’s own body co-emerge with the representation of the self; and therefore the act of representation and the libidinal investment in what is represented, in this case the self, are one and the same process, that is, an enactive process of the subject’s own identity.

Freud does, however, also postulate the idea of primary narcissism: it consists of the subject in relationship with the mother, with whom it is merged, though differentiated. Freud proposes that the baby is not conscious of the differentiation and he supposes this lack of awareness to be of archaic origin. Nonetheless, baby observations of the last decades seem to contradict the Freudian thesis, in that from birth the baby seems to manifest a certain perception of difference between himself and the world around him. He also manifests a certain capacity to represent the world to himself, even if that perception can be a source of discomfort, anxiety, even of terror. But then, did not Freud, like Jung, lack ideas about emergence and enaction? In fact, could one not consider that both primary and secondary narcissism are co-emergent? That the act of representing the world to oneself as different, and of sensing it as non-differentiated, is one and the same indissoluble conundrum?

These questions seem to be allied to the child Jung’s quandary about whether it is he who sits on the stone or whether he is the stone upon which he sits. Eventually this question would lead to the theme of relations between the ego and the self. In summary, all Jung’s thinking led him never to favour either one of these alternatives. Jung’s reference to ‘I’ is quite as fully the ‘I’ of Descartes, the subject of the cogito, which should always be
interpreted as the one who senses and imagines the world from which he emerges, whether it is the inner world of the self, or the external world of the stone, and both worlds are in the end an unus mundus, co-emerging reciprocally one out of the other.

Although worked out by different routes, we can conclude that Freud and Jung share common foundations for their epistemologies regarding aspects like identity, subjectivity in its conscious and unconscious forms, or conscious and unconscious identity. So for those who have chosen to be Jungians, that might be because in Jung’s work this is the dominant line of research, whereas in Freud’s approach, it is developed only slowly from a quite different initial enquiry. Surely, isn’t it only with the late publication of Moses and Monotheism (1937–1939) that Freud frankly embraces this question?

Returning to Jung’s work, I believe it is possible to say in this context that identity is enaction, along with the co-emergence of subject and object, as well as of the self and ego. On this basis, identity is no longer built only upon the body, whose boundaries can be perceived as such only by a properly constituted subject, and by the subject itself, given that it has emerged from itself. Again, Jung’s emerging identity is not a fixed one; rather, it is a process, a constantly reworked dynamic, at least for as long as there is life. Interpreted in this manner, identity cannot be considered as a guaranteed outcome of evolution but rather as a potential without any guarantee. It is a potential founded on the ego’s act of self-awareness faced with the world. It is also an ethical act in that it accepts the consciousness of its own identity being undetermined, by renouncing all certainty, whether the certainty of being he who sits on the stone or of being the stone whereon he sits.

Having arrived at this point, we are confronted with a vision of the world that can be called ‘monist’. This means it is a world where the material and psychic aspects are not perceived as different in essence, but merely in their manifestations, that is in the manner in which they are perceived. Atmanspacher (2014) developed this idea in relation to the notion of synchronicity and has shown how Jung, with Pauli, arrived at a dual-aspect monism, meaning a monism which posits that psychical and material manifestations exist contemporaneously in the world but can be perceived simultaneously only very occasionally. In his 2014 article, Atmanspacher describes the particular qualities of this type of dual-aspect monism and differentiates it from neutral monism where the perceptible emergences of psychical or physical essences of the world do not co-exist. I will not develop this idea further here as it would take us too far from the present argument. What drew me to Atmanspacher’s article in this connection was simply that, by delving into the epistemology of Jung and Pauli in respect of the archetype and synchronicity, he highlights a certain lack of determination – the same, I would argue, as that experienced by the young Carl Gustav sitting on his stone.
I should add that this lack of determination, whether of identity or in epistemological terms, is not evidence of indecision or a lack of resolve on his part, or even an incapacity to differentiate due to developmental deficiencies or to some pathological process. On the contrary, it is an authentic epistemological and ethical choice, one resolutely made by the subject, which in that very movement emerges from having made the choice as a subject, which thereby finds the foundations of its identity.

The notion of identity in the East

The approach to identity I have been putting forward seems to me to be closely allied with those that can be found in the East, particularly in Hinduism and Buddhism, in that these two traditions consider that the identity of the subject cannot be reduced to that of its ego or its consciousness. For these traditions in fact, to identify the conscious subject with only its consciousness is in itself a decoy, an illusion and the source of profound human suffering, of ‘pathology’ then in the etymological sense. From that standpoint the purpose of life becomes the search for a dis-identification of the self, a dissolution of the self in the world.

Obviously, formulated in a conventionally Western way, Eastern thought can seem to be the opposite of Western Cartesian thought, where it counts to be a ‘someone’, a well-defined individual differentiated from his environment. Or again, in answer to the child Jung’s original question, one could say that, where the West answers: I am he who sits on the stone, the East might answer: I am the stone on which he sits. Clearly, the latter would be absurd for Western ears, since the ‘I’ of the phrase could not, from a Cartesian point of view, belong to the stone.

In answer to this apparent absurdity, numerous Eastern traditions of meditation reply with the idea of witness where the witness stands for that part of consciousness that remains conscious of what comes to it, allying this to Jung’s definition of the ego. However, for most of those traditions, the witness, contrary to the Jungian ego, wishes neither for volition nor for action. Whereas the Jungian ego is invited to confront the psychic dynamics that present themselves by being aware and prepared whilst always maintaining its difference, the meditative witness is destined to be merely conscious of all the dynamics and representations that traverse or trouble the subject, whilst letting them pass through like the clouds that pass in the sky without the sky being the least bit disturbed. Here there is no notion of confrontation and the witness does not take either side, nor any position at all save that of withholding any personal standpoint.

In ancient Greek, pathos means suffering.
Here is a difference in ethical positions proposed by the East on the one hand, and Jung on the other. It is a difference of ethical position familiar to us in our clinical practice, where the transference enjoins us at one moment to stay as a witness, but not to intervene in the transference dynamic; or maybe at another moment in the analysis, to take part actively, to participate with our analysand or to confront him. This aspect of our analytic identity, to which I will return briefly at the end of the paper, is visible in Jung during his elaboration of his auto-analytic process which, I think we can say, consisted essentially of allowing himself to be led by the psychic dynamics in order to be able, in a later phase, to get out of them. It is an ethical position that simultaneously demands the stance of a subject confronting its own internal psychic dynamics and that of the subject as witness to what happens to him.

Yet, as might be the case for the Buddhist or Hindu, so it is for Jung that the subject’s identity is not reducible to those aspects of himself of which he might be conscious. In either case consciousness is only the centre of itself and should not be confused with the centre of the subject, any more than with its periphery or its entirety. To be able to define the subject, Subject in capital letters, Hindus refer to it as Atman and the Buddhists call it the Buddha. Both these ideas, here in their more metaphysical than psychological guise, can obviously be allied to the Jungian idea of the self. I shall come back to this. First, it is necessary to establish that these ideas are in fact radically opposed.

The Buddha is also known as the Anatman, since for Buddhists there is no ultimate reality. The world is an illusion, not because it does not exist, but due to its impermanence, the Anitya (or Anicca). Everything that exists is destined to disappear, whether it is a material, psychical or divine reality. The same, therefore, applies to the Atman, which is no less impermanent than anything else.

We have here a pronounced opposition between two metaphysical conceptions of the world. This opposition is so emphatic that it may appear irreconcilable. It is, in any case, an opposition we encounter in its more psychological context in our Jungian community as soon as we delve into the question of the archetype, specifically the issue of the self. Is it all that irreconcilable to view the archetype as a pre-existing structure or as an emergence? In fact, in this case the question becomes insoluble only if one considers it as a temporal linearity, because then the logical implication is to postulate the structure as necessarily prior to the representations that it organizes. Thus, the archetype needs to be envisaged as pre-existing its own manifestations, an a priori given as Jung has it. However, there is nothing to impose such an anteriority, other than man’s strong urge to think about the world in terms of cause and effect, that is acting according to a linear temporality, which then becomes an immutable frame of reference. Then, to speak of emergence rather than of a structure, can appear to threaten that frame of reference.
However, if we recall the earlier example of the biochemical structure of an enzyme, we can understand that a deterministic set can give rise to the emergence of a structure which did not exist prior to its emergence. Here, there is no a priori given, only a complex group of interactions that gives birth a posteriori to a completely new given: that is, the structure of the enzyme that emerges at the same time as the enzyme itself. So following here the live genetic conditions of a process, we witness Darwinian selection in action. I emphasize that it is the conditions of a process and not of a structure that are innate, and it is the process itself that creates both the enzyme and its structure. Obviously to call these conditions innate is insufficient, as they need to encounter other conditions in the environment to activate them. The question of innate or acquired characteristics becomes blurred at this stage, since they give way to a complex ensemble that takes into account not only the extremities of this classical polarity but also the environment where they take place.

Returning then to the theme of the archetype and more precisely to the self, which in Jungian thought is the basis of the subject’s identity, it becomes inevitable to conclude that the self cannot exist except through its manifestations, without which it cannot be, and the first of those manifestations is the individual himself. Therefore, there seems to be a strong connection between Jung’s ‘self’ and the Hindu Atman, in that he is the ultimate reality of the subject, and also with the Buddhist concept of the Anatman, which does not exist per se. Then, to consider the issue of identity, it can only exist in so far as a consciousness ascertains its own contours, that is, acts as witness in the Eastern sense, or as the ego in Jung’s sense. Then again, when he refuses to choose between fusion and separateness while he sits upon the stone, it seems to me that the Jungian ethical position also demands a refusal to choose between a full identity, that of the Atman, or an empty identity, that of the Anatman. Granted, these are among the most extreme opposites it is given to any human to hold. It is a holding of a contradictory confrontation between these two extremes and in an indeterminate context; it is a forthright indecision, a foundational doubt of identity, which finally wrests its strength and robustness from its very instability, from its labile nature and from its structural impermanence. It is this, from my point of view, that both links and differentiates a Jungian approach to the idea of identity from the classical approaches proposed in the East and the West.

In conclusion, I want to say a last word concerning the analyst’s identity in the course of our clinical treatments. Are we not also constantly uncertain of our identity as between what we know of our own personality and what the transference can wreak in us with each of our patients? Is this not the ethical dilemma that entails our holding on to the uncertainty which lies at the root of our identity as analysts in the here and now?
As an illustration of such an identity uncertainty one can meditate on the example of a planet’s orbit around two suns (Figure 2) (Harrison 1998). The animation can be seen on the web: http://www.upscale.utoronto.ca/PVB/Harrison/Flash/Chaos/ThreeBody/ThreeBody.html

![Figure 2. Planet’s orbit around two suns (Harrison 1998).](image)

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**TRANSLATIONS OF ABSTRACT**

Partant de la question que le jeune Carl Gustav se posait sur “sa” pierre, « Suis-je celui qui est assis sur la pierre, ou suis-je la pierre sur laquelle il est assis ? », l’auteur tente de montrer que la notion d’identité se fonde, pour Jung, sur une indétermination choisie. Il en ressort une position éthique autant que méthodologique qui différencie sa démarche tant de la démarche freudienne que de celles des pensées orientales du bouddhisme et de l’hindouisme, tout en ayant de nombreux points communs avec elles. Il s’appuie sur les notions d’émergence et d’énaction (Varela et al. 1992) qu’il développe, arguant que la notion d’archétype, particulièrement du soi, mérite d’être réévaluée au regard de ce nouveau paradigme scientifique.

*Mots clés: identité, narcissisme, Hindouisme, Bouddhisme, archétype, Soi*

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Ausgehend von der Frage, über die der junge Carl Gustav grübelte als er auf ‘seinem’ Stein saß: ’Bin ich der, der auf dem Stein sitzt, oder bin ich der Stein, auf dem er sitzt?’ – versucht der Autor zu zeigen, daß für Jung die Idee der Identität auf einer willentlichen Nichtdetermination gründet. Dieser Standpunkt hat ethische und methodologische
Auswirkungen die Unterschiede sowohl zum freudianischen Projekt wie zum hinduistischen und buddhistischen Denken setzen, gleichzeitig aber viel mit diesen gemeinsam haben. Der Text bezieht sich auf die Begriffe der Emergenz sowie (Varela et al. 1992) Enactuation und argumentiert dahingehend, daß das Archetypenkonzept, besonders in Bezug auf das Selbst, eine Neubewertung im Lichte des neuen wissenschaftlichen Paradigmas verdient.

Schlüsselwörter: Identität, Narzißmus, Hinduismus, Buddhismus, Archetyp, Selbst

Partendo dalla domanda che il giovane Carl Gustav formulò sedendo sul “suo” sassol: “Sono io quello che siede sul sassol, oppure sono il sassol su cui lui siede?” l’autore tenta di dimostrare che, per Jung, l’idea di identità si fonda su una intenzionale non-determinazione. Questa prospettiva ha ripercussioni etiche e metodologiche che la differenziano sia dal progetto freudiano che dal pensiero Hindu e Buddista, pur avendo, al tempo stesso, molto in comune con entrambi. Questo articolo si riferisce alla nozione dell’emergente e dell’enattivismo (Varela et al. 1992) e propone che il concetto di archetipo, specialmente in relazione al Sé, necessiti una rivalutazione alla luce del nuovo paradigma scientifico.

Parole chiave: identità, narcisismo, Hinduismo, Buddhismo, archetipo, Sé

Начав с вопроса, которым задавался юный Карл Густав, сидя на «своем» камне: «Я ли это сижу на камне, или я камень, на котором он сидит?», — автор пытается показать, что для Юнга идея идентичности основывается на преднамеренной недетерминированности. Это состояние приводит к этическим и методологическим последствиям, которые отличают эту идею Юнга и от фрейдистского проекта, и от индийской и буддийской мысли, и одновременно у нее много общего и с одним, и с другими. Статья отсылает к понятиям явления (эмерджентности) и (Вареловского) вдействования и доказывает, что концепция архетипа, особенно по отношению к самости, заслуживает переоценки в свете новой научной парадигмы.

Ключевые слова: идентичность, нарциссизм, индуизм, буддизм, архетип, самость

Comenzando con la pregunta hecha por el joven Jung mientras se sentaba en ‘su’ piedra: ‘¿Yo soy aquel que se sienta en la piedra, o soy la piedra en la cual aquel se sienta?’ — el autor se propone mostrar que, para Jung, la idea de identidad se fundamenta en una voluntaria no-determinación. Esta postura da lugar a repercusiones éticas y metodológicas que se diferencian tanto del Proyecto Freudiano como del pensamiento hindú y budista, mientras que, al mismo tiempo, tiene similitudes con ambos. El presente ensayo hace referencia a la noción de emergencia y de enacción (de Varela et al. 1992) y argumenta que el concepto de arquetipo, especialmente en relación al sí mismo, merece ser revisado a la luz del Nuevo paradigma científico.
从弗洛伊德的自恋到佛教的无我观，通过荣格关于身份的观点进行探讨本文以年轻的荣格坐在“他的”石头上的疑问开始，即：“我是那个坐在石头上的他，还是我是那个被他坐着的石头？”作者以此为开端尝试去说明，对于荣格来说，身份的观点建立于有意的非限定性。这一立场引发了伦理和方法学上的反响，它与弗洛伊德的投射和印度与佛教的思想既有不同，又同时有很多的相似。这篇文章提到了涌现的观点和Varela et al. 1992 关于实践的观念，并主张原型的概念，特别是原型与自我的关系值得重新被评估，从而为新的科学范式提供启发。

关键词：身份，自恋，印度教，佛教，原型，自我