Rebel Organisation and Local Politics: Evidence from Bouna (Northern Côte d’Ivoire, 2002–10)

JEREMY SPEIGHT

Scholars have begun to show how variations in the organization of rebellion in war can impact outcomes related to the violence used against civilians, military effectiveness of armed groups and the post-conflict transitions. This article suggests that existing approaches in this literature overlook sub-group variations in relationships between national-level leaders of armed movements and local commanders. Exogenous factors that explain organizational variation and organizational effects are generally argued to be group wide. By focusing on the local level, I argue that many of the presumed downstream effects of variation in rebel organization can also contribute to the organizational choices leaders make for controlling local actors. This article demonstrates this argument through the case of Bouna in north-eastern Côte d’Ivoire, where a tax revolt against the local Forces Nouvelles (FN) administration, led by local Lobi youth, forced a restructuring in the relationship between Soro and the local FN commander, Morou Ouattara.

Controlling group members and organizing violence represents an enduring problem for leaders of armed movements. For instance, in 2004, soldiers fighting for the Forces Nouvelles (FN), the rebel group that had controlled the northern half of Côte d’Ivoire since the beginning of the 2002 civil war, were accused of breaking into and robbing the branches of the Banques centrale des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) in the northern cities of Korhogo and Bouaké. For many in the international community and within Côte d’Ivoire, these events were emblematic of the general decline in discipline shown by FN soldiers since the early days of the rebellion. Not long after the beginning of the rebellion, indiscipline within the movement rose sharply. Over the duration of the conflict, reports of theft, economic racketeering and violence against civilians in the north steadily increased. The response of the leader of the FN, Guillaume Soro, to criticism against him in the wake of the BCEAO robberies was sharp. In similar cases in which the French forces stationed in Côte d’Ivoire have been accused of indiscipline, ‘no one that I know’, Soro has written, ‘accused General Poncet or Jacques Chirac of complicity with them.’ Rather than reflecting a lack of commitment to the stated aims of the rebellion on the part of FN leadership, for Soro, these attacks demonstrated the
challenge of organizing the use of violence in ways that are aligned with group objectives, and of controlling the influence of the ‘shady’ (véreux) or self-interested elements that inevitably develop within such movements.2

Despite the growing gulf between the rhetoric of the movement and the actions of its members throughout the north as the rebellion wore on, Soro’s reaction to this problem often varied. In May of 2008, Soro forcibly removed the original commandant de zone in Vavoua and Séguéla, Koné Zakaria, and replaced him with another FN bigwig, Issiaka (‘Wattao’) Ouattara. Although officially he was removed for supposed ‘acts of insubordination’ many suspected that the actual reason was the threat Zakaria posed as a result of the firm control over the illicit cocoa trade he had established in this part of the rebel-held north.3 The decision to remove Zakaria from his local position of authority contrasted starkly with the autonomy given to the local FN commander in Korhogo, Fofié Martin.4 Despite controlling trade running across Côte d’Ivoire’s northern border into the rest of West Africa, Martin’s position remained relatively unchallenged until the final days of the conflict. In Bouna, the case focus of this article, Soro radically restructured the local FN administration in response to a tax revolt led by young people frustrated with the high-economic demands of the rebels.

This article examines the general challenge of organizing violence for leaders of rebellion in civil war. It contributes to a growing literature focusing on the impact that internal organization and principal–agent relations within armed movements can have on a variety of interrelated civil-war processes. Scholars have begun to show how variations in relationships between leaders and led forged in war can impact outcomes related to the violence used against civilians,5 military effectiveness of armed groups6 and post-conflict transitions.7 Organizational differences matter as a causal factor because they can enhance or detract from the control leaders wield over their recruits. Varying levels of control determine whether local-level actors can use their position to shirk their responsibilities vis-à-vis movement goals and instead pursue their own independent agenda. By focusing on the organization of rebellion at the local level, this article challenges the existing literature in two significant ways. First, it highlights the fact that scholars in this field remain overly focused on group-level explanations and differences at the expense of within-group distinctions. Organizational effects, as well as sources of organizational variation, are typically thought to be group wide. In reality, what we often find in civil war are ‘heterogeneous landscapes of authority and control’ rather than uniformity.8 Second, too often existing scholarship emphasizes the downward effects of variation in rebel organization (resulting in different levels of group cohesion, violence, democracy/power sharing at local levels or military effectiveness) while explaining differences in the relationships between group members to some exogenous variable (geography, the presence or absence of the natural resources, leadership, the strength of the state). A methodological focus on ‘mid-level commanders’ provides a vantage point to see how political relationships constructed by actors at the meso and local levels themselves shape how organizational forms differ over time and across space.9 One significant outcome of
This approach is that it highlights how the commonly understood causal effects of variation in organizational forms can run in the other direction. How mid-level commanders use violence, mobilize support, and use and distribute resources at local levels can also shape the kinds of relationships developed over time between these actors and national-level leaders.

This article illustrates these relationships through a discussion of the case of the local FN administration in Bouna, in north-eastern Côte d’Ivoire. Despite an absence of any sustained fighting between the rebels and the government since 2003, the rebels continued to control the north throughout a series of failed negotiated peace attempts, leading up to Gbagbo’s forced removal in April 2011. Bouna itself is an instructive case because of the similarities it shared with other parts of the FN-controlled north, as well as its differences. Like elsewhere, residents of Bouna suffered greatly under the burdensome tax regime enforced by the rebels. The demands of the FN became increasingly resented as the conflict dragged on, particularly after the signing of the Ouagadougou Peace Accord (OPA) in 2007 and numerous public promises made by Soro to dismantle the financial system the former rebels had put in place. Throughout the north, not just in Bouna, Soro struggled to control the military wing of his movement who had an ongoing vested interest in keeping this system intact. Yet Bouna arguably became the site where the continued FN management of the north was the most hotly contested by the social groups under its control. In October 2007, the local FN administration, headed by Commandant de zone Morou Ouattara, was the target of a tax revolt led by Lobi youth. In reaction to these events, Soro reorganized the local administration in Bouna as a means of controlling the FN’s military wing and bolstering the legitimacy of the movement in this part of the north. In this article I show how the organization of rebellion in this part of the rebel-held north flowed from Marou’s inability to legitimize and consolidate his position in eyes of Bouna residents, particularly the Lobi community.

This article proceeds in eight sections. The first presents a quick summary and critique of the existing literature on the organization of rebellion. The second section briefly discusses methodology. The third part of the article summarizes the political background leading to the beginning of Côte d’Ivoire’s civil war. The fourth and fifth sections focus on the divisions which emerged within the FN over time. The fourth section examines the development of the northern war economy. The fifth part of the article explains how the economic stakes in continued control over the north for some within the rebellion created deep divisions within the movement, particularly between its political and military wings, leading up to the signing of the OPA in 2007. The sixth and seventh sections shift the focus to the micro level, and the case of Bouna, and how the interaction between local cleavages in this part of the north and broader conflicts within the FN shaped organizational developments in this specific political arena. The final section concludes and summarizes some of the broader implications of this research.
ORGANIZING REBELLION

According to organizational perspectives on civil war, armed group behaviour is largely determined by the capacity of leaders to align the motivations of group members for fighting with the larger goals of the movement. Leaders can do this in one of two broad ways. First, they can create organizational structures that enable rebel leaders to monitor the actions of foot-soldiers on the ground. Actions that deviate from stated group aims can be punished. This can subsequently function as a disincentive for others to shirk leadership goals in pursuit of their own interests. The creation of institutions that facilitate unmediated communication between leaders and foot-soldiers on the ground or closely monitor activities in the field (the creation of ‘political’ wings of armed movements) can enhance control.12 Second, rebel leaders can engage in processes that actually work to alter the preference structures of recruits. Military and political training, schooling ‘in the bush’ and the formalization of codes of conduct are some examples of how groups alter the individual interests of their members, so that that are in accordance with larger group aims.13 In this literature, variations in these organizational attributes emerge as a result of a number of different exogenous factors. Gutiérrez Sanín and Giustozzi suggest that the relative military capacity of the state determines the organizational structure of its armed challenges.14 Johnson argues that as rebels expand territorially, leaders are increasingly forced to delegate authority to local commanders, limiting their ability to directly monitor combatants.15 For Weinstein, the presence or absence of lootable resources shapes the kinds of recruits groups attract and ultimately the kinds of organizations that emerge.16 These studies predict that variations in organizational forms have a number of causal effects relating to the behaviour of recruits, determining how rebels employ resources in the field, use violence, govern civilians and adhere to national-level peace agreements in post-conflict periods.

Whatever their differences, the common emphasis of these perspectives on group-level characteristics and causal effects obscures the internal variation commonly observed in many different civil wars. In Sierra Leone, Krijn Peters observed how the Revolutionary United Front ‘did not always implement similar standards in territories under its control’, suggesting that this often depended ‘on the specific commander in charge’.17 In the struggle for Guinea-Bissau’s independence, Amilcar Cabral complained about the increasing ‘militarism’ of some local commanders who were intent on waging their own war independent of Cabral’s leadership and marginalizing the democratic institutions the Partido Africano de Independência de Guiné e Cabo Verde had put in place.18 In other cases, sub-national developments have been more positive. Regarding the Sudan’s People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in Southern Sudan, Øystein Rolandsen has written that in contrast to other parts of the rebel-held south, in the Nuba Mountains region the SPLA ‘administration was genuinely concerned with the welfare of the local population, who through the chiefs and village councils, had a real influence on decision making processes’.19 This article does not claim that the effects of organizational bodies or cultures are irrelevant for explaining these civil war
processes, but just that organizations alone cannot account for outcomes which vary wildly in territories controlled by rebels, and when organizational difference themselves are explained in reference to shared exogenous factors.

My argument builds from a different starting point: that strongmen who head highly localized wartime political orders do so by drawing on wildly different constellations of social, political and economic power. Some rely heavily on local war economies in extractable resources, or those based on peasant production. Others draw on resources provided by international patrons. Some have wide bases of local political support, while some have little, or function as proxies relying on the support of foreign governments. This article does not aim to explain these differences, but merely attempts to show how the ensemble of resources from which these actors draw can influence whether national-level leaders grant them some autonomy, watch them closely or possibly remove them – or how they build specific organizational bodies around them as a means of enhancing control.

A focus on how local factors can themselves shape principal–agent relations in rebellion mirrors similar interests in the statebuilding literature. For example, in *Law as Process*, Sally Falk Moore questions perspectives which see all other ‘rule generating agencies’ other than the state, as being fully subordinate to it in the day-to-day operation of state power. Rather, what Moore refers to as ‘semi-autonomous social fields’ do enjoy some independence from state institutions and often do have ‘profound effects on their activities on the operation of government itself’. The concept of a ‘semi-autonomous social field’ contributes to a discussion of principal–agent relations in rebellion by showing how the enforcement of principal directives is conditioned by the ‘embeddedness’ of agents in highly localized social orders. This might require that agents contravene the commands of principals as means of enforcing them in a way that is legitimate according to local-level rules of the game. In this way, state power is simultaneously enforced and undercut, but it also shows how the local position of agents can themselves shape principal–agent relations from the bottom-up. Similarly, Catherine Boone shows how economic autonomy and the level of social hierarchy within local communities condition the institutional choices made by different West African states. Boone shows that in cases in which states chose to build institutions around ‘traditional’ social systems already in place – such as in northern Côte d’Ivoire or the groundnut basin in Senegal – local actors were able to exert far more autonomy from the central state than in other cases. The general point here is that where local agents of the state were able to respond meaningfully to the needs of local populations and retain some legitimacy and local political support, their actions deviated more and more from the interests of political leaders in the capital. The inverse was also evident. Where, in southern Côte d’Ivoire for instance, local agents of the state had few ties to local communities, retaining their position was far more dependent on achieving developmental goals and maintaining the good graces of national-level politicians in Abidjan.

What these works contribute to a discussion of organization in rebellion is that they collectively provoke important questions about the direction of causal relations
assumed by much of the civil-war literature. For instance, in *Inside Rebellion*, Weinstein argues that one causal effect of the National Resistance Army’s (NRA, Uganda) strategy of mobilizing recruits through pre-existing ties and political and ideological training was the unique system of local government it had put in place while in control of southern Uganda. Weinstein writes that ‘the NRA put in place a structure of local government that put power squarely in the hands of the civilian population.’

Irrespective of the normative goals advanced by democracy promotion in territories under rebel control, local-level democracy can also impede principals and agents within organizations from pursuing common goals. When local community interests diverge from larger group aims, being beholden to these interests can cause agents to behave in ways that are inconsistent with the interests of their principals. Conversely, the use of violence and the absence of legitimacy locally may strengthen organizational bonds by undercutting the relationships of recruits with these communities. In both cases, the relationships forged by local actors can itself shape those that emerge in rebellion between leaders and led, rather than the other way around.

**METHODOLOGY**

To support these theoretical claims, this article examines the case of the FN, and the development of its local administration in Bouna, in north-eastern Côte d’Ivoire. As a methodological approach, single case studies have distinct advantages and disadvantages. Limitations stem from broader problems related to research designs with a small sample size. Specifically, questions surrounding the representativeness of selected cases can bias research findings and limit their generalizability. Yet case studies do have strengths, and can serve to supplement findings derived from cross-case quantitative studies. Single cases can aid researchers refine concepts, provide descriptive inferences, test and derive new hypotheses, illustrate causal processes or mechanisms, unpack complex causal relationships and identify new variables to be used in future research.

The ambiguity surrounding the actual representativeness of single cases, vis-à-vis the larger universe of cases, is a problem confronting all case-work, but represents a particularly daunting challenge for this article. As suggested above, much of existing research on the organization of rebellion in civil war has focused on questions relating to strictly group-level variations and processes, by focusing on the impact of a growing set of exogenous variables (natural resources, the nature of state, the geographic reach of armed rebellion). Systematic comparative research on the organization of rebellion at the local level has been rare. The boundary of the universe of cases that Bouna ‘represents’ is hardly clear. The in-depth historical narrative provided in this article responds to this lacuna and to Gerring’s challenge for researchers under these circumstances to ‘overreport’ as a means of providing “‘fieldnotes’ of possible utility for future researchers”. Beyond the descriptive inferences provided by this article, by drawing on a focused case study at the local level, I also raise theoretically significant questions regarding the assumptions
surrounding the spatial uniformity of organizational development in rebellion, as well as the direction of the causal relationships (from national levels, downwards) assumed in much of the existing literature. By focusing on a single case, this article can control for, and weigh the influence of distinct causal factors.31

Although the rebel administration established in Bouna is the principal focus of this article, I alternate between different levels of analysis to examine the relative significance of alternative causal factors and pathways. I begin by examining the divisions that emerged within the FN over time, and the challenges confronted by Soro and the rest of the political leadership of the movement. These are problems commonly highlighted by the literature on the organization of rebellion in civil war. However, by shifting the analytical lens to the local level in the second half of the article, I show how organizational dynamics cannot be understood independent of the interaction between these divisions (between Soro and his local-level commanders), and distinct local-level factors. There is no existing scholarship on this part of northern Côte d’Ivoire during the political division of the country between 2002 and 2011. In order to fill this gap, this article builds off of ethnographic field work conducted in northern Côte d’Ivoire between August 2010 and March 2011, which included semi-structured interviews with over 20 individuals in Bouna, including local FN leaders, local politicians, non-governmental organization (NGO) workers and a number of ‘traditional’ elites. Interviews were supplemented and triangulated by evidence drawn from archival and Internet research.

THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF THE REBELLION IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE

Up until the early 1990s, political stability and economic development in Côte d’Ivoire were ensured through carefully managed coalition building and ethno-regional balancing by the country’s long-time president, Houphouët-Boigny and the Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) one-party state. However, beginning in the 1980s, high levels of corruption and resulting economic stagnation, coupled with failed economic liberalization policies imposed by the World Bank, threatened the patronage networks that Houphouët-Boigny had used since independence to support the PDCI’s national-level coalition.32 By the 1990s and the onset of multiparty politics, the political pacts that underpinned political stability and economic development in Côte d’Ivoire began to unravel. The country’s first elections held in 1990 were won handily by the PDCI. However, heightened political competition between elites at the national level and increasing resentment towards support received by the PDCI from ‘non-Ivoirians’ in rural areas, particularly in the cocoa-exporting regions of the South-West, pushed Côte d’Ivoire’s political system to the brink of crisis. Houphouët-Boigny’s appointed successor Henri Konan Bedié politicized this resentment through the construction of ivoirité, an ultra-nationalist discourse which challenged both the citizenship of non-autochthones and ultimately the candidacy of one of his key political opponents in the 1995 elections, Alassane Ouattara.33 Both the Rassemblement des républicains (RDR) and the
Front populaire ivoirien (FPI) decided to boycott the elections. Consequently, Bedié and the PDCI won this round of elections by a wide margin.

Bedié’s government was marred by corruption and scandal, and ultimately found itself abandoned by many of its friends, both at home and abroad. In 1999, Bedié was overthrown in a bloodless coup led by General Robert Guéri. Many military officers of northern origin backed Guéri because they thought he would put an end to the increasing discrimination and political marginalization of Ivoirians of northern origin. However, Guéri, himself from the South-West where anti-immigrant sentiments were strong, also relied on the idea of ivoirité to mobilize support for his fragile regime. Opposition to Guéri grew within the armed forces. Following an alleged assassination attempt on his life in September of 2000, Guéri ordered a harsh crackdown on soldiers of northern origin. Accused of plotting against him, many northern soldiers were tortured and/or killed. Most of those who survived fled to neighbouring Burkina Faso. Guéri ultimately decided to run in the controversial Ivoirian presidential elections of 2000. The legitimacy of these elections was debated because outside of Laurent Gbagbo of the FPI, many of the leading candidates, particularly Alassane Ouattara of the RDR, were excluded from running because of questions regarding their Ivoirian citizenship. When it appeared that Gbagbo would win the elections, Guéri promptly annulled the results. Amidst growing protests about his government, Guéri fled to Benin.\(^34\) Gbagbo subsequently declared himself the victor despite calls from the other parties for fresh elections in which all candidates were allowed run. Drawing support primarily from the autochthonous communities of the South-West, Gbagbo continued the policy of systematically discriminating against northern and immigrant communities since his contentious electoral victory.

In response, the 19 September 2002 rebellion was launched from Burkina Faso by former members of the Ivoirian military who had sought refuge in the country since the beginning of Guéri’s crackdown. The FN is a coalition comprising the Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), the original movement, and two other rebel groups that emerged soon after in the western part of the country, the Mouvement pour la justice et la paix (MJP) and the Mouvement pour la libération du Grand Ouest (MPIGO). Its leadership came from a number of sources. Some, like Louis Dacory-Tabley, a former FPI bigwig, were individuals marginalized by Gbagbo’s inner circle. Many who comprised the political wing of the movement were former members of Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte d’Ivoire (FESCI) who were involved in the on-campus violent conflicts between the FPI and RDR factions running through FESCI. Many of these actors formed the rebel administration in northern areas under control of the FN after the beginning of the war.\(^35\) Guillaume Soro, the future leader of the movement, was himself a former FESCI leader. Much of the FN leadership was also drawn from former members of the Ivoirian military who had also been responsible for organizing the Guéri coup. Ibrahim Coulibaly (popularly referred to as simply ‘IB’) is generally seen as the mastermind of the movement. However, soon after, the initial attacks by the movement were repelled by loyalist forces and the partition of the country by the
French enforced *zone de confiance*, elements loyal to IB were purged from the FN through a series of violent factional conflicts in the major northern cities of Bouaké and Korhogo in 2004. These purges effectively consolidated control over the movement, and the north, by forces loyal to the political head of the FN, Guillaume Soro.

**THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR ECONOMY IN THE NORTH**

At the onset of the rebellion, the *Force Nouvelles* enjoyed modest popular support from northern populations. A growing hostility to Gbagbo and his supporters in the South, who were seen as unjustly marginalizing and persecuting Ivoirians of northern origin since coming to power after the 2000 elections, enhanced the popular backing of the FN. The legitimacy of the FN was also buttressed by its ability to maintain a degree of political order during the early stages of the rebellion. However, as the war dragged on, fatigue with the rebellion grew and relationships between northern populations and the rebels gradually deteriorated. The discipline of foot-soldiers that had characterized the early days of the rebellion slowly declined as reports of economic predation increased. Many high-ranking FN members were able to use the rebellion as a pretext to carve out control over the lucrative trade routes running through northern zones. In particular, many of the *commandants des zones* used their new source of authority to enact personalized control over local war economies. In Bouaké, commandant Issiaka (‘Wattao’) Ouattara charged trucks 5,000 CFA for a ‘ticket Wattao’ and passage through his zone.36 Similarly, for passage through the corridor South of Bouaké, commandant Soro (‘Doctor’) Dramane required a payment of 2,500 CFA.37 Before his removal in 2008, commandant de zone Koné Zakaria personally controlled all tax revenue derived from cocoa exports leaving Séguéla.38 Despite these exactions, many FN foot-soldiers were not paid by local rebel leadership. As a result, foot-soldiers increasingly used their minor positions of authority to extract resources from civilians as means of supplementing their income. Roadblocks set up on roads and pathways were used by soldiers to demand payments from northern populations. Threats of arbitrary detention was one way the ‘justice’ system installed by the FN was also used to demand payment.39

By 2004, the political leadership of the rebellion began to institutionalize and centralize the system of economic regulations and exaction through the creation of *la Centrale*. Overall, the FN was made up of three parallel organizational bodies running from the national administrative centre of the rebellion in Bouaké, down through regional administrative offices in the cities and towns under their control:

- A military wing; the *Forces Armée des Forces Nouvelles*, which includes its head, Soumaïla Bakayoko, and all of the *commandants* in control of the 10 *com’zones*;
- A political wing; the *cabinet civile*; headed by the secrétaire general, Guillaume Soro, and his representative at the level of the *com’zone*, the *déléguant general*;
- And a financial wing; *la Centrale*, headed by André Ouattara, represented by at the level of the *com’zone* by agents called *régisseurs*.40
In theory, the FN extended its reach over local areas through these three principal organizational bodies. In practice however, these bodies were unevenly inscribed throughout the northern zones under the control of the FN. The failed 2002 coup attempt and the military stalemate that followed required that the FN establish at least minimal military control over the vast territory they had inherited. The *com’zones* were generally the first institutions put in place. For a long time, the *com’zones* remained poorly monitored (if at all) by the national-level political and military leaders of the movement. Soro in particular appeared more than willing to grant this autonomy to local military commanders who remained loyal to him during the 2004 conflicts between pro-Soro and pro-IB faction of the FN. As a result, commandants such as Fofie´ Martin in Korhogo and Koné Zakaria in Séguela could establish and maintain personal control over the economic resources in their respective zones.

Through *la Centrale*, the FN aimed to extend its reach over the entirety of the north, taxing and regulating much of economic life in northern zones. The UN’s Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire reported that there are five principal revenue-generating activities that are managed by *la Centrale*: the taxation of transported goods through a system of checkpoints on major roads; budget contributions (*budget de contribution*), which are taxes levied on all major companies doing business in the north; service charges for utilities such as water and electricity; natural resources, particularly diamonds and gold; and the ownership and taxation of fuel depots throughout the north.\(^4^1\) Much of the FN’s total revenue is derived from two key sectors: cocoa and other natural resources including gold and diamonds.\(^4^2\) Although much of the cocoa-producing regions of the South-West have remained under the control of government forces since the beginning of the rebellion, the FN did control some substantial cocoa-producing areas in the western part of the country, particularly the region around Vavoua–Séguela. In 2006–07, the UN estimated that northern Côte d’Ivoire produced 128,000 tons of cocoa which amounted to almost 4 per cent of global production of this commodity (southern Côte d’Ivoire produced 37.2 per cent of total cocoa production).\(^4^3\) The large American NGO Global Witness estimated that between 2004 and 2007, the FN averaged $30 million per year from the cocoa trade.\(^4^4\) Mineral extraction has also comprised a large portion of the FN’s tax revenue. There are two large diamond mines in northern Côte d’Ivoire: Tortiya (100 km South of Korhogo) and Séguela (125 km West of Bouaké). Although the exact value of this market is unclear, many FN leaders profited from its growth either through direct participation in the marketing of Ivorian diamonds or by taxing diamond miners.\(^4^5\) Overall, control over these illicit economies worked to enrich much of the FN’s leadership, to the expense of many living in the north during this period.

**THE POLITICS OF THE POLITICAL TRANSITION, 2007–10**

In 2007, the FN, Laurent Gbagbo, and the heads of the principle opposition parties involved in the political transition (RDR, PDCI) signed the OPA, which represented
the last in a series of failed pitched efforts to peaceably resolve the conflict. The OPA included a number of important provisions that specified the responsibilities of the transitional government moving forward. These included a process of national identification, demobilization, administrative reunification and a timetable for holding national elections. One important political effect of the OPA was that it significantly strengthened the hand of Soro and the FN vis-à-vis Gbagbo and the opposition parties involved in the negotiations. This resulted primarily from the decision to name Soro as the prime minister (PM), replacing the then PM, Charles Konan Banny. Banny, the former Governor of the Bank of West African States, was originally named interim PM in 2005 until elections could be held. Gbagbo sought to neutralize Banny from the outset as a means of reinforcing his own political authority. Banny, lacking a real power base of his own, found his powers as PM drastically curtailed. The relationship between the PM and President Gbagbo changed with the nomination of Soro. In contrast to Banny, Soro could draw on significant material resources and political support derived from his position as head of the FN. With Soro as the PM, Gbagbo now confronted an opponent who wielded comparable political influence and clout.

However, many within the FN became suspicious of Soro’s nomination as PM and the close relationship between Soro and Gbagbo, after the signing of the OPA. For some, the removal of Gbagbo was the aim of the rebellion and aligning with him at this point was just too much to bear. In a similar vein, others suggested that the political deal struck with the signing of the OPA was at cross-purposes with the general political values and interests that underpinned the northern rebellion. For some, the process of national identification contravened notions of equality of citizenship for which the war was fought. Formulating some criterion for establishing Ivoirian citizenship was a sticking point for many within Gbagbo’s camp; however, this concession left many FN foot-soldiers exposed, because they lacked the necessary documents to identify them as Ivoirian citizens. Leading up to the signing of the OPA, commandant Cherif Ousmane criticized the peace process in this way, stating that ‘you can’t share four years with soldiers who offered you their lives, and then overnight, throw them into the wild, without pieces of identification, without projects for professional reinsertion and in deplorable conditions of security.’

Comments such as these from some within the FN appeared to reflect an emergent division within the movement between those looking to push the peace process forward and those who remained more sceptical of the intentions of its authors (and hence more reluctant to disarm). Another illustrative example was the 2008 public spat between André Dakoury Tabley, the then assistant to the General Secretary of the FN (Soro) and the commandant de zone in Bouaké, Issiaka (‘Wattoa’) Ouattara. The basis of this conflict revolved around a 2008 RDR congress, where RDR president Alassane Ouattara underscored many of the commonalities between his party and the stated aims of the FN. Consequently, in wrapping up his speech at the congress, Ouattara made a general invitation to all FN members to join the RDR as a means of continuing their struggle against Laurent
Gbagbo. Dakoury Tabley called Ouattara’s invitation ‘courageous’.\textsuperscript{49} Wattao’s reaction to this overture was sharp, stating that ‘we are the arbiters in the peace process. Dakoury came to eat. If he eats he’ll keep quiet. If he wants to leave, he’ll leave. Indeed, he is an opportunist who doesn’t know how the FN was created.’\textsuperscript{50} For Wattao, Dakoury Tabley did not represent the broader interests of many within the FN. His acceptance of Ouattara’s overtures represented an effort to advance the agenda of a small cadre within the FN that, for Wattao, was largely out of sync with many military actors on the ground who still had a stake in the continuation of the conflict and FN control over the north. The conflict between Wattao and Dakoury Tabley was not an isolated incident; it seemed to reflect a broader schism running through the heart of the FN about the political future of the movement. These divisions were also reflected in the 2009 calls coming from within the FN for Soro to step down as the PM in the transitional government, suggesting that the OPA power-sharing agreement did not sufficiently advance the interests of the movement.\textsuperscript{51} Some have even mused that elements within FN were responsible for the June 2007 assassination attempt on Soro’s life, when rockets were fired on a plane carrying himself and some of his closest aids.\textsuperscript{52}

These conflicts stem from the ways the peace process disproportionately advanced the interests of different segments within the FN. For Guillaume Soro, the former FPI member, RDR sympathizer, FESCI president turned rebel leader; the war and the subsequent peace process highlights how in Africa, as Pierre Englebert has written, ‘political violence usually provides marginalized and excluded groups with the means to fight for (re)insertion into the system.’\textsuperscript{53} Indeed, the war and the subsequent peace processes facilitated Soro’s emergence from relative obscurity to arguably the second most powerful politician in the country, behind Laurent Gbagbo. Even under Ouattara in the post-conflict government, commentators continue to whisper about the future political ambitions of Soro, who is still not yet 40. Yet Soro’s rise, and the support he was able to garner from some within the FN and Ivorian public more generally, was always highly contingent on his perception as a committed arbiter of the Ivorian peace process. His legitimacy derived from his capacity to carefully manage the divisions between the old antagonists in the conflict (the FN and the FPI) and within the FN itself. For Soro, securing his post-conflict political position was conditional on the peace process moving forward. Yet for a sizeable group within the FN, particularly many of the commandants des zones, the peace process seriously threatened to undercut their prominent political positions established during the war. Most recognized that not all the military elites on the FN side would benefit from the reunification of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{54} The aim of administrative reunification, as outlined in the OPA, through the return of mayors and other administrative agents of the central state to northern zones, threatened the local control over illicit commodity markets established by these actors during the course of the conflict. Not surprisingly, a number of prominent com’zone leaders – including Cherif Ousmane in Bouaké, Hervé Touré in Katiola and Koné Zacharia in Séguéla – all publicly expressed their scepticism to the OPA.\textsuperscript{55} After the signing of
the OPA, most commandants resisted any attacks on their authority, subverting efforts at administrative and military reunification in the process.

Beyond the conflicts between Soro and the military wing of the movement, the leadership of the FN was also forced to manage the growing resentment of their foot-soldiers during the terminal stages of the war. While the rebellion had opened up great opportunities for the accumulation of wealth for some within the FN, the economic gains from war were not equally shared. By the end of the conflict, large disparities in wealth existed between the politico-military leadership of the FN, and the foot-soldiers who had signed up to fight. Many grievances revolved around the failures of the FN leadership to pay the basic salaries of foot-soldiers. Soldiers expressed sharp criticism of this failure, especially given the wealth accumulated by many of their leaders. One stated that ‘despite our misery, they have flaunted their wealth, even their dogs are better treated than us.’ In Bouaké, some former fighters went further arguing that ‘Soro is against us!’ or that ‘Soro has betrayed us!’ Overall dissension within the movement grew in light of the failures of the FN, specifically Soro, to negotiate a peace deal that benefited all FN members, not one perceived to secure the interests of only the leaders of the movement.

These criticisms became particularly pronounced during the political transition after the signing of the OPA, when many soldiers realized that the material promises made to them at the beginning of the conflict would not be upheld. Feelings of betrayal were enhanced by the fact that in most cases, many of the programmes set up to reintegrate former combatants back into civil life not only failed to materialize, but were in fact used by high-level political actors, both on the government and FN sides, as a means for further enrichment. Together, these factors prompted a number of popular movements and demonstrations organized by both former and current FN fighters, which confronted the FN after the signing of the OPA in many of the zones under their control. The bubbling frustration expressed by many current and former fighters with the leadership class of the FN gave this set of actors sufficient reason to use and protect their minor positions of authority because of the small economic benefits they could derive from them. Much like many of the commandants des zones, FN foot-soldiers confronted powerful incentives to slow down and undermine Soro’s efforts to push the national-level peace process forward and to maintain the economic system the rebellion had put into place. This had implications for the relationships between the FN and civilian populations after the signing of the OPA, and organizational developments within the movement.

THE BOUNA TAX REVOLT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The myriad of conflicts that had emerged within the FN by the time the OPA was signed and its effects on the organizational development of the FN are particularly well illustrated by the case of Bouna, in the extreme north-eastern part of the country. Bouna and its surrounding rural areas are inhabited by the indigenous Koulango and a number of other groups, such as the Peul, Malinké and Lobi, who migrated to the region from surrounding West African countries. The Lobi in
particular arrived in massive numbers throughout the 19th and 20th centuries from northern Ghana and southern Burkina Faso. Historically, the region itself was politically organized around a number of hierarchical city-states – in Kong, Bondoukou, Nassian and Bouna – that derived their power from their integration into trans-Saharan trade routes that had criss-crossed West Africa, leading up to the colonial period. However, by the beginning of the 20th century, successive wars of colonization, first by Samory Touré and then by the French, put an end the Sahelian trade networks, effectively undercutting the material bases of the political power of these city-states. Immigration itself worked to limit the power and authority of the old political kingdoms in the North-East. In particular, Lobi migration, coupled with the emigration of Koulango youth to southern regions of Côte d’Ivoire, radically shifted the balance of power between these two groups. Georges Savonnet estimated that by 1975, there were 80,000 Lobi living in north-eastern Côte d’Ivoire compared to 7,500 Koulango. Although the relationship between these groups was initially, and for a time, amicable, relationships between them became increasingly strained. This resulted from a number of interrelated factors including heightened competition over land, increased demographic pressures (as a result of the cumulative number of migrants who had settled in the region, particularly the Lobi), land degradation (stemming from over usage) and environmental change (drought).

Tensions between these two groups were exacerbated by the beginning of the civil war and the installation of the FN in the region in September of 2002. For a start, the insurgency in Bouna and the surrounding North-East was far from a home-grown movement – all of the local rebel leadership were ethnic Senoufo’s – coming from the centre-north region around the city of Korhogo. The high-fiscal demands of the FN in Bouna reinforced initial feelings of resentment. Shopkeepers in the central market paid 8,000 CFA per month. Upon leaving Bouna, trucks carrying cashews paid an exit fee of 400,000 CFA. Those carrying yams paid 205,000 CFA. At checkpoints set up around the perimeter of the city, individuals paid between 200 CFA and 1,000 CFA in order to enter or exit the city. These rates are high, especially for a region that had been historically economically depressed, before the war and especially during it.

The tax system put in place by the FN aggravated the relationship between the Lobi and Koulango in Bouna because many Lobi believed that the rebels specifically targeted their group for payment. Residents of Bouna commonly complained that the FN demanded that all travelling through the north present Ivoirian identity cards. Those who could not provide adequate identification – usually the migrant groups such as the Lobi, but also the Mossi, Malinke and Peul – had to pay significant sums to the rebels. This drew some criticism from these groups because opposition to the process of national identification partly motivated the northern rebellion in the first place. Opposition also grew as a result of the fact that the FN specifically targeted Lobi women carrying yams to the market between Bouna and the surrounding countryside. If women could not pay the demanded sums at FN checkpoints (and often they could not), soldiers required the payment of two yams as compensation.
In other cases, some FN soldiers simply waited along the narrow pathways linking Bouna and the surrounding countryside to threaten Lobi women and demand payment. Many saw these tactics as morally incomprehensible because the FN appeared to target the most vulnerable of the Lobi population.

Frustration with the FN crystallized on 21 October 2007 when a number of young people from the Lobi community in Bouna violently confronted the FN after they had been informed that some women had been harasseed for money on their way to market. This group of youth first confronted the FN checkpoint leading southward out of the city towards Bondoukou on the government side of the North-South border. Not satisfied with the response of the rebels, the group left the checkpoint towards the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) base in Bouna that was manned by a Ghanaian contingent. Together, the Ghanaian General and the group left the UNOCI headquarters to discuss the situation with three members of the local FN military hierarchy. After some ensuing frustration with the progress of this meeting, some of the group of Lobi youth armed themselves and attacked the FN checkpoint controlling the corridor-nord, between Bouna and Doropo in the direction of Ghana, as a means of putting an end to the system of exactions the FN had put in place. Afterwards, they confronted the FN checkpoint controlling the corridor-nord, between Bouna and Doropo. In response, the FN opened fire on this group of Lobi youth, chasing them back into the centre of Bouna. Some ultimately fled eastward to Ghana or to the South in the direction of Bondoukou. For the Lobi youth, the result was dozens injured and one death. Bouna residents commonly refer to this day as the ‘dimanche noir.’

THE DYNAMICS OF REBEL ORGANIZATION: THE FN IN BOUNA

Bouna’s ‘dimanche noir’ did not go unnoticed at the national level. Although not long after the signing of the OPA, the events in Bouna represented a stark reminder that Soro’s calls to push the peace process forward in northern zones were being resisted by some groups within the FN. Since the signing of the OPA in 2007, Soro had put substantial public pressure on the military wing of the FN to hasten the dual political processes of military demobilization and administrative reunion in the territory under FN control. Minimally then, the confrontation between Lobi youth and the local FN in Bouna showed that Soro did not have complete control over certain elements within the movement. The burdensome tax system installed by the rebels, particularly ‘le racket sur les routes’, the system of checkpoints manned by the FN across the north, remained in place despite Soro’s calls to the contrary. What these events demonstrated to others, both in the international community and in Gbagbo’s camp, was that either Soro was himself not fully committed to the peace process, or that he could not credibly commit to the peace process on behalf of the military wing of the movement, particularly the commandants des zones.

As a way of correcting this image, Soro committed to re-organizing the rebellion in this part of the north. Like other regions in the north, the com’zone in Bouna continued to remain largely autonomous from any political and fiscal control exerted
by national-level leaders of the movement throughout the conflict. The FN’s minimal effort to politically mobilize this part of the country in support of the rebellion contributed to the perception of rebel control over the North-East as an occupational, rather than a liberation movement. As stated above, one reason for this was that the local FN leadership in Bouna was drawn largely from other parts of the north, particularly from the Senoufo heartland around Korhogo. However, another equally important reason was that the FN administration in this part of the north was comprised solely of its military wing – headed by the commandants des zones Marou Ouattara. Offices for la Centrale and the cabinet civile were not established until after 2007, following Bouna’s dimanche noir. Indeed, one way of reading the ultimate installation of la Centrale and the cabinet civile was that they were in fact organizational responses to the eroding legitimacy of the FN in this part of the north (culminating in dimanche noir).

The very absence of these institutions partly contributed to the confrontation between the Lobi community and the FN in Bouna, and the overall illegitimacy of the FN in the North-East more generally. In other parts of the north, the déléguant general played a vital role in politically mobilizing civilian populations and legitimizing the movement. Interviews in Korhogo, for instance, revealed that the déléguant general fulfilled a number of important administrative and political functions concerning problems related to healthcare provision, education and agricultural production; establishing external relationships with NGOs and foreign governments working in Korhogo and the surrounding rural areas; and communicating to the public the aims and strategies of the movement (through television and radio broadcasts). The distinctly ‘political’ function played by the déléguant general in Korhogo was absent in Bouna. Military leaders positioned in Bouna since the beginning of the rebellion understood their position as being one concerned strictly with military issues and problems, which had very little to do with the political aims of the movement. This had two implications for the legitimacy of the rebellion in this part of the north. First, the FN made little effort to mobilize support and explain the aims of the rebellion. This was particularly problematic in the rural areas surrounding Bouna, where ideas about citizenship, nationalism and the national-level cleavages driving the conflict were poorly understood. As a result, the FN confronted a political environment in which fear and scepticism of the rebellion predominated. Second, the departure of the state administration after the beginning of the civil war forced the rebels into a position in which they were expected to play some role in the regulation of everyday social conflict such as those over land, marital disputes and the distribution of aid. Some NGO workers in Bouna explained to me that the capacity and legitimacy of the rebels to play this role was limited. In the eyes of the local population, many rebel decisions often appeared ad hoc and self-interested. In many cases, rebel decisions resulted in the exacerbation of these conflicts, rather than resolving them. The military presence of the FN in Bouna heightened tension between themselves and local populations and between the different ethnic groups in the region, not only because the demands they placed on this community were high (this would describe much of the north), but also
because they appeared to target some specific groups or others. As one representative of the Lobi community stated ‘the Lobi did not create the rebellion, but they have the impression that the rebels have come to humiliate them.’

Between ‘dimanche noir’ in October and the end of 2007, the FN established offices for both la Centrale and the cabinet civile in Bouna. Representatives for these distinct wings of the FN expressed mandates directly related to improving the relationships between the FN and the local population, particularly the Lobi community. For agents of la Centrale, regulating the taxes imposed on goods and services in Bouna, functioned as a means of depoliticizing their application. This included decisions on what could be taxed. For example, after 2007, the powers of local taxation over the local market were granted to the local mayors’ office rather than to agents of the FN. This signalled to local populations (specifically the Lobi, and Lobi women) that goods brought to the market on market day could not be taxed by the FN. Second, the imposition of la Centrale brought tax levels for goods, and services in Bouna into line with tax levels for the same goods and services elsewhere in north. Although it is difficult to evaluate whether this was in fact the case, the perception that the tax rate was particularly high under Marou Ouattara was prominent in Bouna and the arrival of la Centrale appeared to be one way of correcting this image.

Likewise, the intended function of the délégué général in Bouna was to play an intermediary role both between the FN and the local population and between different segments within this population. This included a number of things. Soon after their arrival, members of the office of the délégué général met with the representatives of the key constituencies in Bouna: the King (Koulang), the Imam (Dyula, Mossi) and the Lobi chief. They also met with a number of youth leaders in the community, even some involved in the organization of the fight against the FN. The aim of these meetings was to both provide a forum for the expression of grievances against the FN and facilitate the expression of the larger local and national-level aims of the rebellion to local community members. The délégué général also functioned as a mouthpiece for local populations’ vis-à-vis the military wing of the movement. One member of the office for the délégué général suggested that some of the most complained about taxes, such as the levies on motorcycles passing between Bouna and the surrounding countryside, had declined or been abolished as a result of their insistence vis-à-vis commandant Ouattara. This political wing of the FN has also provided a more legitimate forum for the resolution of disputes arising from within local populations. After 2007, the office of the délégué général assumed some responsibilities for regulating conflict over the payment of bride-wealth and divorce. Another important issue dealt with by this branch of the FN was land-use conflicts in rural areas. Here, the FN helped negotiate the adequate payment of compensation to Koulang and Lobi landholders, whose farms had been damaged by cattle owned and managed by Peul pastoralists. However, it is difficult to say to what extent these organizational renovations – the installation of la centrale and the délégué général – altered the relationship between the local population in Bouna and the FN. During fieldwork in January
2011, soon after the contested presidential elections in late 2010, many in Bouna retained a heavy resentment towards the rebels.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Most existing approaches focusing on the organization of rebellion in civil war remain wedded to group-level explanations and comparisons. Privileged exogenous causal factors – the presence or absence of natural resources, state strength, or the geographic breadth of territorial control exerted by armed movements – are typically thought to have group-wide effects on the relationships between leaders and led in rebellion. An important implication of this characteristic of the existing literature is that because the actions of local-level commanders and foot-soldiers commonly function as the dependent variable in many of these explanations, how these actors share power with civilian populations, mobilize support, employ violence or distribute resources are rarely thought to be important factors weighing on the organizational choices leaders make. This article challenges these assumptions. My central argument is that the relationships which emerge between local communities and mid-level commanders (and their foot-soldiers) over time in civil war can themselves go far in explaining variations in the rebel organizations which link the leaders at the apex of these movements to their representatives on the ground.

One important implication of the argument advanced in this article is that it suggests that the processes by which organizations emerge and develop are interactive. Organizations are just as much products of the relationships which form between local commanders and the communities under their control, as they are an independent causal factor shaping the relationships which form between armed movements and civilian populations in civil war. This article showed how, over time, divisions grew within the FN between Soro and the rest of the political leadership of the movement, and many belonging to the military wing of the movement, specifically many of the local military commanders, the commandants des zones. These conflicts came to the forefront particularly after the signing of the OPA. Subsequent efforts to transfer political authority to agents of the state (bureaucrats, mayors, prefects) and away from the FN’s military commanders on the ground were met with stiff resistance. Yet, what this research suggests is that organizational dynamics observed in Bouna cannot be understood solely in terms of the conflicting interests between these groups. In Bouna, there were observable interactive effects between the actions of the local branch of the FN (specifically in terms of economic predation), local-level political cleavages already present before the start of the war and the organizational dynamics of interest to this article. The tax regime controlled by the FN in Bouna exacerbated existing tensions between the Koulongo and Lobi communities, and ultimately between the Lobi and the FN itself. The installation of the offices of la Centrale and the cabinet civile functioned as a way for Soro to bring the actions of the local FN in line with the national-level objectives of the movements, and buttress the legitimacy of the local arm of the FN.
in Bouna. In short, the picture of organizational formation and development that emerges from this article is one that is substantially different from the image of organizational genesis portrayed by much of this literature. What it shows instead is that local-level actors are nested within different local/national networks of political and social power. The challenge for the researcher is to show how embeddedness in these fields oppose, complement and/or feed into each other in different ways.

One reason why these processes have been largely ignored by researchers focusing on the organization of rebellion is that existing scholarship has focused almost solely on relative levels of violence or economic predation as an indication of control. In Bouna, resistance organized against the local branch of the FN (particularly from the Lobi community) stemmed not just from the economic demands of the rebels, but also how these demands worked to exacerbate pre-existing tensions at the local level. Conversely, the absence of any opposition to armed movements in other cases might reflect the capacity of an armed movement to draw on political support from local partners, just as much as it might indicate the enhanced control by rebel leadership. The absence of violence or economic predation could also suggest an absence of control if local commanders are beholden to other local political interests, and then employ material and coercive resources that are at cross purposes with larger group aims. Recalling Sally Folk Moore’s discussion of the ‘semi-autonomous field’, local agents of armed movements should require some support drawn from within local communities as a means of enacting their authority in any meaningful way; however, being beholden to these interests might also cause representatives to act in ways which waver from the goals of rebel leadership. Either way, focusing on violence or economic predation alone, should only be taken only as a partial indicator of rebel organization.

The second point that emerges from this study is that the organization of rebellion in civil war should be seen as a highly uneven territorial process. If, as I argue in this article, organizations are the products of both the struggles between leaders and led in rebellion and ways in which local-level commanders authorize their wartime control, then we should expect these organizations to generally exhibit patchwork, rather than uniform qualities. Yet the extent to which we consider this as a broader characterization of the organization of rebellion depends on the generalizability of Bouna as a case. This is a contentious point because a few comparative studies asking these questions have focused explicitly on the local level. The fact that most of the existing research on the organization of rebellion in civil war ignores interactions between national and local-level processes means there are few other cases with which to compare the experience of Bouna to. Minimally then, this research should push others to focus on similar micro-level interactions. Indeed, while this article has focused specifically on questions related to organizational genesis and reform in rebellion, it seems to support Ana Aronja’s general claim that ‘war may take a different form across local territories, unleashing strikingly different dynamics. Local communities are thus prone to live very different wars – and very different lives – throughout the territory where the war goes on.’ Exploring these differences requires less of a focus on the characteristics
of ‘groups’, (or ‘group-ness’ more generally) but on meso-level factors – on what Manning Nash has termed ‘closely viewed crucial instances’ – which frame our attention on local differences in the ways local commanders legitimize their position, mobilize support, build political coalitions and challenge or distribute authority at local levels.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Earlier versions of this article were presented at the African Studies Association Annual Meeting in Washington DC in November 2011, the International Studies Annual Meeting in San Diego CA in April 2012 and in the Department of Political Science, Concordia University in January 2012. I would like to thank the following for providing insightful and constructive comments on earlier drafts of this article: Ceren Belge, Stephanie Ferrara, David Hornsby, Michael Lipson, Amy Poteete, as well as two anonymous reviewers. I also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

NOTES

2. Ibid. p.104.
15. Johnson (note 6).
16. Weinstein (note 5).
22. Ibid. pp.57–64.
24. Boone writes ‘according to the World Bank (1978: 148) the planning process constituted “a major exception” to the norm in Côte d’Ivoire in that it “took place outside of the regular planning process and involved political bodies in the provinces to a meaningful extent. Local officials were able to stress regional goals and to exercise greater control [than elsewhere in Côte d’Ivoire] over the allocation of funds”’. Ibid. p.272.
29. For the only exception that this author is aware of, see: David J. Maxwell, ‘Local Politics and the War of Liberation in North-East Zimbabwe’, Journal of Southern Studies 19/3 (1993) pp.361–86.
36. 500 CFA equals approximately $1.
38. Global Witness Organization (note 4) p.34.
47. Ibid. p.4.
50. ‘Nous sommes des arbitres dans le processus de paix. Dakoury et venu pour manger, qu’il mange et qu’il se taise. S’il veut partir, qu’il parte. D’ailleurs, c’est une arriviste qui ne sait pas comment les FN ont été créés’, Ibid.
55. Ibid. p.13.
56. ‘Face à notre misère, ils font étalage de leurs richesses et même leurs chiens sont mieux traités que nous’; Alain Bouabre, ‘Quand la rébellion refuse de mourir’, *Soir Info* 28 Dec. 2007.
57. Kisselminan Coulibaly, ‘Soro est contre nous’ ‘Ce qui s’est passé à Vavoua est petit’, *Soir Info* 10 Jul. 2008.
63. Ibid.
65. Author Observations, January 2011, Bouna, Côte d’Ivoire.
69. Interview, NGO Worker, 27 Jan. 2011, Bouna, Côte d’Ivoire.
70. Interview, NGO worker, 27 Jan. 2011, Bouna, Côte d’Ivoire.
71. Abalo (note 64).
73. Interview, FN administrator, 22 Jan. 2011, Bouna, Côte d’Ivoire.
74. Interview, FN administrator, 6 Feb. 2011, Bouna, Côte d’Ivoire.
75. This echoes Stephen Lubkemann’s criticism of the treatment of civil wars as ‘violent things’ which privilege ‘the most dramatic, acute, and outrageous manifestations of violence’ at the expense of other, equally significant wartime political and social processes. See Stephen C. Lubkemann, *Culture in Chaos: An Anthropology of the Social Condition in War* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 2008) p.10.

