IN TRYING TO UNDERSTAND NIETZSCHE’S CONCEPT of eternal return, the novelist Milan Kundera contrasts the weight of singular historical events with their transformation into something ephemerally light as they move away from us in time and distance: “If the French Revolution were to recur eternally, French historians would be less proud of Robespierre. But because they deal with something that will not return, the bloody years of the Revolution have turned into mere words, theories, and discussion, have become lighter than feathers, frightening no one.” 1 Similarly, in grappling with how civil wars end, it becomes too easy for historians, especially those concerned with historical memory or usable pasts, to trivialize through abstract analysis the real trauma inflicted on human beings over the course of a war by substituting historical memory for the visceral experience of violence that comes during wartime. But if historians take a more rigidly defined perspective to define how civil wars end, then we miss all of the subtle ways in which the conflict rages on even after the war has presumably ended. 2

The Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) is a good case in point. General consensus points to April 1, 1939, as the end date, with the Republicans’ unconditional surrender to the Nationalists. The Nationalists won—no doubt about it. Pockets of armed resistance continued until the early 1950s, but Francisco Franco’s sovereignty remained unquestioned. These facts, however, tell us little about the violence and trauma inflicted on the Spanish people. It is time to ask the public to bear the weight of the Socialist Repression, which has long remained hidden from view.

I would like to recognize the many people who helped me craft this article. Thanks to Fay Yarbrough, who offered me insights into the American Civil War during our long walks together. Jennifer Davis aided me in considering relationships between terror in the French Revolution and the Spanish Civil War. David Chappell provided food for thought about the theoretical underpinnings of civil wars. I would also like to thank the anonymous readers for the AHR, whose critiques helped to strengthen my final draft, and Rob Schneider, the “article whisperer,” who shepherded me through the writing process. Finally, I owe a great deal to Melissa Stockdale and Bob Rundstrom, who did their usual yeoman’s labor: Melissa sacrificed much time talking to me about wars of occupation and the Russian Revolution and Civil War, and she read and criticized the original draft of this article; Bob spent hours helping me formulate my arguments, reading my first draft, picking apart my writing, and offering me encouragement when necessary.


2 For example, Roy Licklider argues that civil wars end when “multiple sovereignty” and “physical violence to people” (which he defines as “1,000 battle deaths or more per year” and “effective resistance”) end. Licklider, “How Civil Wars End: Questions and Methods,” in Licklider, ed., Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End (New York, 1995), 3–19, here 9–10. His figure of “1,000 battle deaths or more per year” comes from the Correlates of War project. Some of this data can be found in Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980, 2nd ed. (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1982), 214–215.
trauma that the Franco regime inflicted on Spain’s populace long after the war officially ended. How do we fathom the thousands of babies stolen from women between 1939 and 1950 and the continuation of that practice against “social undesirables” until fifteen years after Franco’s death? And what about the forced starvation, the concentration camps, the long-term imprisonment, the economic privation, and the denial of burials and public mourning for the fallen on the Republican side? Some might simply say that these practices fall under the category of terror. But then that begs the question, what is the relationship between civil war and terror? In Spain, I think, it is nearly impossible to separate the two. If, as Carl von Clausewitz said, “War is the continuation of political activity by other means,” then it seems that terror is war’s corollary, the continuation of war by other means.3

Roy Licklider has contemplated how difficult it is “to visualize how civil wars can end . . . in civil wars the members of the two sides must live side by side and work together in a common government to make the country work.”4 But in Spain’s case, this whole premise is false. Franco never intended to cooperate with his opponents in the postwar period, and the war did not really end with the Republicans’ unconditional surrender.5 Instead, the Nationalists transformed the civil war into a decades-long war of violent occupation against those who had actively or passively allied themselves with the losing side.

Traditionally, scholars and lawmakers avoid the term “occupation” in the context of civil wars and employ it to describe circumstances arising from international warfare, such as the Allied occupation of Germany after the Second World War, and yet we also know the difficulty of defining its exact nature.6 We already know from earlier civil conflicts that both the victors and the vanquished often perceived military forces on the defeated side’s land as occupying troops.7 Additionally, a military occupation’s purpose is “not just to ensure the security of the victor states, but to


supervise and aid reconstruction and to regenerate the wicked.” 8 Finally, military force is not always necessary to maintain an occupation, but the threat of force can do so. 9

Using the guidelines above, we can certainly view the Franco regime’s treatment of the war’s losers as a form of military occupation. In Spain’s case, the Franco regime found numerous ways to construct the followers of Republican Spain as foreign and “anti-Spain,” and therefore sought to inoculate itself against the foreign virus. 10 The architects of the National Catholic state that emerged after 1939 certainly envisioned themselves as guardians of national security and upholders of moral rectitude, and they enforced their counterrevolutionary agenda through terror and propaganda.

Although the regime may have stopped actual military occupation of Republican strongholds after the 1940s, its treatment of “enemies of the state” resembled most closely the Soviet Union’s actions against its neighboring client states: power relations on the surface may have appeared calm, but leaders tamped down apostasy through the unspoken threat of military violence. 11

Terror became the immediate means to enforce the occupation, to express the regime’s legitimacy, and to consolidate its program of counterrevolutionary measures. 12 By waging a campaign of physical and psychological terror and long-term social and

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9 Ibid., 11.

10 The concept of Republican Spain as foreign and “anti-Spain” will be discussed later in this essay, but it is worth noting Michael Richards’s comment: “It is not surprising that many Spanish children grew up believing that ‘la guerra de España’ was fought by Spaniards against foreigners.” Richards, “From War Culture to Civil Society: Francoism, Social Change and Memories of the Spanish Civil War,” History & Memory 14, no. 1–2 (2002): 93–120, here 98.

11 Hugh Seton-Watson’s discussion of how the Soviet Union occupied Eastern Bloc states is analogous to what happened earlier in Spain, and thus germane to my argument in this essay: Eastern Bloc countries were organized under single-party dictatorships; in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, “the leading non-communist parties were either arrested by Soviet military police or compelled to escape abroad,” and “the actions of arrest, intimidation, and appointment of governments subservient to Moscow were carried out in the name of the Soviet commanders in chief, but the key Soviet personalities on the spot were usually civilians.” “The cultural apparatus—schools, universities, press, literature, the arts”—served to highlight the achievements of Soviet leaders and Soviet culture. Writing toward the end of the Cold War, Seton-Watson concluded: “The truth is that the political and social systems existing today in the six countries [Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany] were imposed and consolidated by Soviet military power, and they are kept in being by either the presence of Soviet forces . . . or the knowledge that they can be brought to bear in a very short time. Thus, in a sense, military occupation has existed in these countries for nearly thirty-eight years and it continues.” Seton-Watson, “Military Occupation,” 8, 8–9, 10, 11. So in the case of Spain, occupation, as defined above, still existed in milder forms until Franco’s death, despite the official end of martial law in 1948.

12 Julián Casanova argues that all civil wars end with terror, but the Spanish Civil War is unique in the duration of its terror. Scholars of the Soviet Union and Communist China might disagree with this assessment, however. Casanova, “Una dictadura de cuarenta años,” in Julián Casanova (coord.), Francisco Espinosa Maestre, Conxita Mir, and Francisco Moreno Gómez, Morir, matar, sobrevivir: La violencia en la dictadura de Franco (Barcelona, 2002), 3–50, here 5. For a more conservative approach to the duration of the terror, see Julius Ruiz, Franco’s Justice: Repression in Madrid after the Spanish Civil War (Oxford, 2005). Although this essay deals with Nationalist atrocities, Republicans also committed numerous atrocities during the war. But because the Nationalists were able to consolidate their gains and engage in terror and repression for decades after 1939, this essay is focused almost solely on their methods of terror. For more information about atrocities on the Republican side, see Julius Ruiz, The “Red Terror” and the Spanish Civil War (Cambridge, 2015); the essays in Santos Juliá, ed., Víctimas de la Guerra Civil (Madrid, 1999); José Luis Ledesma, “Total War behind the Frontlines? An Inquiry Into the Violence on the Republican Side in the Spanish Civil War,” in Martin Baumeister and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum, eds., “If You Tolerate This . . .”: The Spanish Civil War in the Age of Total War (Frankfurt, 2008), 154–170. For a discussion of “atrocity memory battles,” see Antonio Cazorla-Sánchez, “Revisiting the Legacy of the Spanish Civil War,” International Journal of Iberian Studies 21, no. 3 (2008): 231–246.
economic repression, by suppressing public mourning for Republican victims of the war, and by enforcing a collective public memory that included only Nationalist war sacrifices, the Franco regime prolonged its civil war. The scale of violence did diminish considerably from the 1950s onward, aided by at least four important factors that, because of space limitations, cannot be addressed here: in-migration from the countryside to the city, out-migration to northern Europe, the phenomenal influx of foreign tourists, and the rise of a consumer society fueled in part by these three forms of migration. Despite the softening of the regime’s brutality in its latter decades, the population’s memories of civil war violence and immediate postwar terror induced a collective shell shock that would end only after the dictator’s death in 1975. Because the majority of the protagonists are now dead, the pain inflicted by this war has eased, although it has not wholly disappeared. The war continues to be replayed in the public sphere by those who claim to be the guardians of its memory.

The Spanish Civil War was not meant to be a war at all. The Nationalist generals who staged a military rebellion followed a path common to the Spanish military since the early decades of the nineteenth century: whenever leaders of the Spanish state seemed incapable of handling the process of governing, the military stepped in to “restore order,” imposing new leaders and, sometimes, new forms of government. In this case, the rebellious generals, responding to what they perceived as the complete breakdown of public order and the Republic’s imposition of policies that were deemed anti-Spain, rose against the Spanish Republic on July 17–18, 1936. The insurgents hoped to convince the remainder of the military to join their cause and jolt Spain back onto its proper path. About half the civilian and military populations resisted, and the Nationalists’ initial failure prompted them to seek German and Italian military aid. Thus a simple rebellion transformed into a protracted civil war.

The civil war itself, as many scholars have attested, was a grab bag of several wars: wars of class, religion, nationalism, and political ideology. The class wars emerged out of a combination of Spain’s uneven economic development and the landed and industrial elites’ reluctance to share their substantial power with the in-

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13 Two recent books in English have done a good job of exploring the implications of migration for the great social and economic changes during the last two decades of the Franco regime. They also help to explain why Spanish citizens seemed apolitical and even satisfied with life under Franco from the 1950s onward: Michael Richards, After the Civil War: Making Memory and Re-making Spain since 1936 (Cambridge, 2013); Antonio Cazorla Sánchez, Fear and Progress: Ordinary Lives in Franco’s Spain, 1939–1975 (Chichester, 2009). To understand the dynamic relationship between tourism and the Franco regime and the regime’s ability to adapt to changing circumstances, see Sasha D. Pack, Tourism and Dictatorship: Europe’s Peaceful Invasion of Franco’s Spain (Basingstoke, 2006). A more general discussion of the evolution of the Franco regime from 1959 on can be found in Nigel Townson, ed., Spain Transformed: The Franco Dictatorship, 1959–1975 (New York, 2010).

14 Naomi Klein’s The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York, 2007) informs much of my analysis in this essay. Although her book deals specifically with neoliberal’s attempts to remake the world according to their versions of free-market capitalism, it is her analysis of how neoliberal have exploited various forms of “shock”—economic and natural disasters, terror, torture, etc.—that shaped my thinking about the Franco regime’s use of terror early on and the changes his regime was able to impose in the following decades, even when the threat of terror had lessened. According to Klein, once citizens are shocked to the point where they are merely trying to survive, leaders can transform their countries without meeting much resistance.

15 These coups d’État were known as pronunciamientos.
creasingly restive rural and urban proletariat. Religious conflict also predominated. Legislation enacted during the Republic to secularize the state alienated many in the Catholic clergy and laity, who perceived these laws as brutally anticlerical. They mobilized politically to discredit the Republic’s legitimacy. Matters were not helped much when, at the very beginning of the war, leftists torched religious buildings and killed priests, monks, and nuns with impunity, ensuring that the Catholic hierarchy would ally itself unabashedly with the Nationalist cause. The dynamics of clericalism/anticlericalism found rhetorical expression in the Nationalists’ labeling of the war as a crusade.16 Competing versions of nationalism also played an important role in the war. Regional national groups, especially the Catalans and Basques, achieved autonomous status during the Republic and early civil war. Nationalists viewed these as attempts to calve off from Spain, and therefore as treasonous and inimical to Spain’s historic identity as a powerful empire with a civilizing mission.17

Finally, one cannot understand this war without contending with political ideology, both domestic and foreign. A quick survey illustrates the range of political and social affiliations that each side tried to contain. Anarchists, communists, anti-Stalinist communists, socialists, liberals (republicans of varying stripes), and regional nationalists constituted the Republican side; the Nationalists incorporated members of the radical right, conservative right, and revolutionary right, aiming to unify traditional Catholics, two monarchist groups, fascists, large and small landowners, industrialists, and parts of the army.18 Because the Republic and the civil war played out against the backdrop of Continental Europe’s increasing ideological polarization, it became too easy to portray the war as a Manichean struggle between fascism and communism (despite the paucity of members in either group at the beginning of the war), obscuring the combatants’ resplendent spectrum of political affiliations and internal divisions, especially on the Republican side. The Spanish Civil War became internationalized when the Italians and the Germans entered the conflict on the Nationalist side; the Soviets allied with the Republicans, sending international brigades from fifty-three nations to fight in Spain; and the other Western powers chose the path of non-intervention. This combination of asymmetrical foreign military aid and dogged neutrality on the part of the remaining Western powers tipped the balance of power in favor of a Nationalist victory.19 Conflicting aims on the Republican

16 Nuns were killed at a less significant rate than their male counterparts, however. Mary Vincent, “The Spanish Civil War as a War of Religion,” in Baumeister and Schüler-Springorum, “If You Tolerate This . . .,” 74–89, here 79. For a small selection of other works dealing with the civil war as a religious war, see Julio de la Cueva Merino, “El anticlericalismo en la Segunda República y la Guerra Civil,” in Emilio La Parra López and Manuel Suárez Cortina, eds., El anticlericalismo español contemporáneo (Madrid, 1998), 211–301; Vicente Cárce11 Orti, La persecución religiosa en España durante la Segunda República, 1931–1939 (Madrid, 1990).

17 Parts of the Basque Country gained limited autonomy during the civil war. Needless to say, their autonomy was stripped after the Nationalist victory.

18 Monarchists included those who followed Alfonso XIII, the exiled king of Spain, and those who remained loyal to the Pretender line descended from Carlos, Fernando VII’s brother (1784–1833). The Carlists, critics of liberalism, fought three civil wars in the nineteenth century and reprised their role as defenders of the values of the radical right in the early 1930s. The revolutionary right was best represented by the Falange, the Spanish fascists. According to Stanley Payne, the fascists, unlike the radical right, really hoped to revolutionize social and economic relations. For a more detailed description of his right-wing typographies, see Payne, Fascism: Comparison and Definition (Madison, Wis., 1980).

19 One of the greatest historiographical debates of the Spanish Civil War centers on what factor contributed most to the Republic’s downfall. Since there are thousands of books covering this topic, I am
side created dissension and fractured an already shaky alliance, one that clashed over carrying on a social revolution and a war simultaneously, or concentrating on defeating the Nationalists on the battlefield and saving the social revolution for later. Additionally, the Republicans’ inability to consistently feed their troops or the civilians behind their lines enables us to see, at least in hindsight, that the Republicans were going to lose this war.\textsuperscript{20}

But losing a war (or ending it) can mean different things, depending on the victors’ aims. As others have written, war settlements can be negotiated, can be made unconditional, or can combine military supremacy and negotiation, depending on how the victors and the vanquished perceive the stakes of surrender.\textsuperscript{21} Before the “May Days” of 1937, President Manuel Azaña, with the help of Britain’s Anthony Eden and the tacit approval of the Vatican, tried to initiate a negotiated settlement that would have included creating an internationally monitored plebiscite to determine what kind of government Spaniards wanted for themselves.\textsuperscript{22} Franco would have no part of such a negotiation. Later, two other attempts to negotiate a humane settlement for the Republicans in March 1939 met with equally firm rejection.\textsuperscript{23} Franco required unconditional surrender, and he finally got it on April 1. But the war did not really end. Not for the losers.

Gaining power does not necessarily imply that one will maintain it. Just as revolutions often produce an outcome completely different from the one originally imagined (see France, Russia, and Iran, for example), civil wars and national reconstructions are also subject to the colliding forces of planning and contingency.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{20} For a detailed analysis of how the Nationalists were better able to feed their troops and civilians, see Michael Seidman, \textit{The Victorious Counterrevolution: The Nationalist Effort in the Spanish Civil War} (Madison, Wis., 2011).


\textsuperscript{22} The “May Days” of 1937 refer to the Republican civil war within a civil war on the streets of Barcelona, captured so vividly, though insufficiently, in George Orwell’s \textit{Homage to Catalonia} (New York, 1952).

\textsuperscript{23} Both Republican general Segismundo Casado, now in open revolt against Prime Minister Juan Negrín’s government, and Negrín tried to negotiate reasonable settlements. Santos Juliá also discusses other attempts to gain amnesty for Republicans in the years 1944, 1948, 1956, and 1962, all to no avail. See Santos Juliá, “De ‘guerra contra el invasor’ a ‘guerra fratricida,’” in Juliá, \textit{Víctimas de la Guerra Civil}, 11–54, here 31–32, 49.

\textsuperscript{24} For example, would Reconstruction in the American Civil War have taken a more promising turn if Abraham Lincoln had not been assassinated so soon after the war ended?
In Spain’s case, when the Nationalists won the war, eradicating all of Spain’s “Red” influences seemed possible, although not guaranteed. The Second World War had not yet begun, but Europeans knew that it loomed ahead. When war finally broke out across the continent, Spain was sitting pretty, a passive ally of the seemingly invincible Axis powers. With Europeans’ attention focused elsewhere, the Franco regime waged a fierce campaign of terror against its real and perceived enemies. But even though the Axis powers eventually lost, the Franco regime remained unscathed. A combination of Spain’s wartime isolation and postwar international apathy enabled the regime to enact measures of repression and terror so extreme that even Heinrich Himmler was startled by the ferocity of it all.

To escape the Nationalists’ retribution, around 500,000 Spaniards left Spain at the close of the civil war and in the following decade. About half eventually returned. Many who had fled to France were placed in refugee camps, and later, after the Germans occupied France, some 15,000 Republican refugees were deported to the Nazis’ Mauthausen Concentration Camp, where it is estimated that less than half survived.

For those who stayed in Spain, the foreseeable future remained bleak. Until the summer of 1939, Republican POWs were held in temporary concentration camps that served as clearinghouses for identifying enemies of the state. Some 700,000 prisoners were processed through about fifty camps, where they faced starvation, beatings, torture, or even execution. Guards often raped female prisoners. Eventually the regime shut the camps down and transferred people to overcrowded prisons throughout the state. By the end of 1940, at least 280,000 people had been

25 Although Spain was not a formal ally of the Axis powers, the Franco regime did send the Blue Division to fight with the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.
26 Julius Ruiz, “A Spanish Genocide? Reflections on the Francoist Repression after the Spanish Civil War,” Contemporary European History 14, no. 2 (2005): 171–191; Paul Preston, The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain (New York, 2012), 495. There is a growing historiographical debate over the nature of the Francoist terror, whether it was premeditated or a functional response to post–civil war conditions, and whether or not it was genocidal. Given the scope of this roundtable, I do not want to wade into those murky waters. For a select understanding of the premeditation argument, see Francisco Espinosa Maestre, “Julio de 1936: Golpe militar y plan de exterminio,” in Casanova, Maestre, Mir, and Moreno Gómez, Morir, matar, sobrevivir, 51–119; Michael Richards, A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco’s Spain, 1936–1945 (Cambridge, 1998); Alberto Reig Tapia, Franco “Caudillo”: Mito y realidad (Madrid, 1996). For a more cautious and functionalist reading of the war and postwar terror, see Stanley Payne, The Franco Regime, 1936–1975 (Madison, Wis., 1987). Ruiz, Franco’s Justice. In his shorter piece, Ruiz argues that “local research indicates a correlation between the institutionalisation of the Francoist ‘New State’ and a decline in the number of executions; the bureaucratisation of the killing process produced fewer victims”; “A Spanish Genocide?,” 176.
27 Francisco Moreno, “La represión en la posguerra,” in Juliá, Víctimas de la Guerra Civil, 277–406, here 282–285. The original camps in southern France and North Africa were called refugee camps, but some Spanish historians refer to them as concentration camps because of their appalling conditions. For Spanish prisoners of Mauthausen, see David Wingate Pike, Spaniards in the Holocaust: Mauthausen, the Horror on the Danube (London, 2000). For concentration camps in Spain, see Javier Rodríguez, Cautivos: Campos de concentración en la España franquista, 1936–1947 (Barcelona, 2005). For Spanish exiles, see Alicia Alted, La voz de los vencidos: El exilio republicano de 1939 (Madrid, 2005).
28 Female prisoners’ children were also taken from them after the age of three or four and sent to social services and/or religious schools, where serious religious education might cleanse the children of their Marxism. Casanova, “Una dictadura de cuarenta años,” 26. According to Preston, some twelve thousand children were taken away from their prisoner parents at the end of the war. Preston, The Spanish Holocaust, 511–513. For a detailed discussion of children of POWs, see Ricard Vinyes, Montse Armengou, and Ricard Belis, Los niños perdidos del franquismo (Barcelona, 2003).
imprisoned. All in all, it is estimated that the Nationalists executed about 100,000 people toward the end of the war, and around 50,000 died soon thereafter, either by execution or from the cumulative and debilitating beatings, starvation, and disease that were ubiquitous in prison.29

The ideological and legal framework for postwar repression had begun early in the war and became strictly codified by its end. Almost all of these measures served to define, or in many cases redefine, criminality as those acts that the Nationalists deemed anti-national or anti-Spanish. A mere two weeks after the beginning of the war, the Nationalists’ Junta de Defensa Nacional (National Defense Council) declared martial law throughout Spain and vowed to use military tribunals to punish anybody who demonstrated any opposition to the Nationalists or the Franco regime.30 This meant, for example, that officers who remained loyal to the Republic at the start of the Nationalist rebellion could be tried and immediately killed for military treason by these tribunals. To rationalize the legality of the Nationalist uprising, the Nationalists resorted to verbal gymnastics by redefining the terms “legitimate” and “illegitimate.” The conservatives who created what became known as the Bellón Commission report characterized the military rising not as a rebellion but as a necessary act to restore a legitimate government to Spain. From this idea sprang the logic that “Republican and Popular Front organizations were essentially ‘criminal’ and ‘anti-national.’”31 Therefore, by reconfiguring the Republic and its defenders as illegitimate and the Nationalists as the keepers of the true Spanish flame, the Nationalists could justify a series of laws that Franco’s brother-in-law Ramón Serrano Súñer would in his later years characterize as “upside-down justice.”32

Three laws served to delineate the “criminals” from the “true Spaniards” and to punish those who acted against the interests of the nation: Redemption through Work, the Law of Political Responsibilities, and the Law of Repression of Freemasonry and Communism.33 Redemption through Work, which echoed the language of Catholic redemption and the perverse slogan Arbeit macht Frei found at the entrance of Nazi concentration camps, allowed convicted prisoners on the Republican side to redeem their anti-Spanish sins through forced labor in reconstruction projects and by building monuments to the Nationalist dead. The Law of Political Responsibilities required those found guilty of crimes against Nationalist Spain to pay some kind of economic sanction, usually in the form of fines and the expropriation of property.34

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29 Casanova, “Una dictadura de cuarenta años,” 8. For comprehensive discussions of the varieties of repression after 1939, see Moreno, “La represión en la posguerra”; Javier Rodrigo, Hasta la raíz: Violencia durante la Guerra Civil y la dictadura franquista (Madrid, 2008); Rodrigo, “‘Our Fatherland Was Full of Weeds’: Violence during the Spanish Civil War and the Franco Dictatorship,” in Baumeister and Schül-Springorum, “If You Tolerate This . . . ,” 135–153; and Preston, The Spanish Holocaust.

30 Ruiz, “A Spanish Genocide?,” 172. Martial law was not lifted until 1948.

31 Ibid., 173.

32 The term in Spanish is justicia al revés. Ramón Serrano Súñer, Entre el silencio y la propaganda, la historia como fue: Memorias (Barcelona, 1977), 245.

33 Known respectively in Spanish as Redención de penas por trabajo (January 1, 1939), Ley de responsabilidades políticas (February 1939), and Ley de represión de Masonería y el Comunismo (March 1, 1940). For an in-depth discussion of these various laws, see Moreno, “La represión en la posguerra,” and Ruiz, Franco’s Justice.

34 Sometimes even a suspect’s relatives’ assets were seized in order to find a suspect who might have eluded the regime’s net. Ruiz, Franco’s Justice, 134. This practice could have devastating effects, for example when officials, in the name of expiating Republican sins, seized sewing machines from Republican
They could also be stripped of the ability to find work that could pay a living wage. This law primarily affected the laboring classes. The Law of Repression of Freemasonry and Communism helped purge, through imprisonment or exile, the two groups whose ideologies were deemed most dangerous to Franco’s vision of Spain. These laws and a host of other decrees, enforced by agents of the state, the Catholic clergy, and vindictive citizens, became the foundation of and justification for widespread violence and terror against perceived enemies of the state. And although the intensity of the violence diminished considerably after the 1940s, political executions occurred in Spain until 1963.

Less violent means of repression continued throughout the Franco regime to remind the war’s losers that their values were antithetical to Spain. They were now reduced to ghostly presences in two significant ways: as shadow people who could never participate as full citizens in Spain’s reconstruction, and as specters trotted out to haunt those who might try to deviate from the regime’s policies. Repression took such forms as ritual humiliation and economic privation. The cumulative effects of this “long uncivil peace” served to keep people scared, silent, and compliant.

Public shaming became part of the victors’ arsenal. Immediately after the war, women targeted by the regime were forced to march through their villages, their hair shorn, holding signs describing their crimes. Some were fed castor oil so that they would inevitably defecate themselves while on public display. Men and women paraded as penitents—a ritual the Catholic hierarchy strictly enforced—while their reputations were publicly pilloried. Children would be reminded of their parents’ “crimes,” while townspeople, even those who might have had Republican sympathies, shunned those the regime targeted. In public, Catalans and Basques were forced to use Castilian instead of their native language.

Although petty and grand humiliations may have damaged the defeated population, these actions probably scarred them less than the economic destitution they faced in the subsequent years, especially in the “hungry forties.” The war’s victors created and enforced a system of economic injustice that rewarded their own followers with jobs and encouraged them to profit from the subjugated populace’s mis-

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35 Most of those charged under this law had their cases dismissed, but some 300,000 people had files kept on them, and two-thirds of those files belonged to people from the working classes, thus making their ability to earn a living much more precarious and ensuring their silence in the face of repression. Moreno, “La represión en la posguerra,” 346–348.
36 Ruiz, Franco’s Justice, chap. 6. In his newest work, After the Civil War, Michael Richards posits that much of the internal migration from the countryside to the cities in the 1950s onward occurred because villagers persecuted by their neighbors for the crimes of republicanism sought to live in large urban areas in order to maintain a semblance of anonymity, to protect their families from even more reprisals, and to erase the memories of the war and immediate postwar terror.
37 According to Francisco Moreno, violence was a structural element of Francoism. Julián Casanova and Javier Rodrigo, among others, make a similar point. Moreno, “La represión en la posguerra,” 277; Julián Casanova, “Presentación,” in Casanova, Maestre, Mir, and Moreno Gómez, Morir, matar, sobrevivir, ix–xi, here ix; Rodrigo, Hasta la raíz, 27.
38 Communist leader Julián Grimau was the last to be executed after being sentenced under a military tribunal. He was charged with the old postwar standby, “crimes of blood.” Ruiz, Franco’s Justice, 224.
39 This apt term comes from Casanova, “Presentación,” x.
40 Preston, The Spanish Holocaust, xix; Richards, A Time of Silence.
ery, while condemning the vanquished economically by cutting off most means of economic survival and punishing them with jail time if they attempted to feed themselves by circumventing the laws. Starvation, or its threat, became the greatest cudgel in crushing whatever postwar resistance might remain. The regime’s deliberate policy of economic autarky, combined with a corrupt food-rationing system, a burgeoning black market, and the exclusion of the defeated from viable work, created a devastating famine in the 1940s.\footnote{It is still pretty easy when traveling around Spain to determine by sight which generation of Spaniards suffered during the “hungry forties.” They are significantly shorter than the general population.} Although definitive statistics do not exist, it is estimated that some 200,000 people died of starvation between 1939 and 1945.\footnote{Cazorla Sánchez,\textit{ Fear and Progress}, 60. Michael Richards views the Francoist policy of autarky as a deliberate strategy to isolate, quarantine, and purify the Spanish nation. Accordingly, it served to eliminate the “disease” of Marxism and its related illnesses that had “infected” Spain from the outside. Additionally, he claims, “Scarcity was used to control the population. At least twice the quantity of essential food was sold on the black market as was issued officially. Significantly, this black market . . . was popularly considered as a central part of the Francoist terror.” He also says, “Self-sufficiency, in the sense of a denial of any political, cultural or economic dialogue about the future, was an essential part of Francoist reconstruction.” Richards, \textit{A Time of Silence}, 135, 174. While Richards seems to indicate that the Franco regime deliberately created the conditions to starve his enemies, others believe that although autarky was intentional, the devastating economic effects of this policy were not. Instead, they reflected a combination of institutional corruption and a complete incomprehension of economic theory. See, for example, Cazorla Sánchez, \textit{Fear and Progress}, 60–61. Food rationing did not end until 1952; Conxita Mir, “El sino de los vencidos: La represión franquista en la Cataluña rural de posguerra,” in Casanova, Maestre, Mir, and Moreno Gómez, \textit{Morir, matar, sobrevivir}, 121–193, here 123.} Poverty did not cease after the 1940s, but by the late 1950s and 1960s, many Spaniards were allowed and encouraged to work in other European countries. Other Spaniards migrated from the countryside to the industrial centers of Madrid and Barcelona to improve their economic fortunes.\footnote{Internal migrations peaked in the 1950s and 1960s, with the majority of people heading to Madrid and Barcelona. The second tier of migration occurred in Valencia and the Basque provinces of Guipuzcoa, Biscay, and Alava. By 1975, “one out of four Spaniards was living in a municipality different from that of his or her birth.” Spaniards went to other European countries as migrant workers. From 1961 to 1970, approximately 84,000 migrants went to places such as Switzerland, France, and Germany annually. Cazorla Sánchez, \textit{Fear and Progress}, 95–96, 108.} When terror subdued the vanquished population, and the more obvious forms of oppression subsided by the early 1950s, other, less physically violent techniques eroded resistance to the regime and provided the framework for what some term “memoricide,” the erasure of a conquered people’s memories of and perspectives on historical events. In their stead, the regime, in collaboration with the Church, constructed and maintained an almost monolithic public narrative: the Nationalists had rescued Spain from undesirable foreign elements, and through their tireless efforts had managed to maintain peace in Spain for decades.\footnote{In 1964, the Franco regime spent much of the year commemorating the Nationalist victory in 1939 with an extensive propaganda campaign to remind all Spaniards how the Nationalists were able to keep the peace. The commemorative campaign was called “25 Years of Peace.” For details of the celebrations, see Paloma Aguilar, \textit{Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to Democracy}, trans. Mark Oakley (New York, 2002), 112–128.} By flooding the people in all corners of Spain with an endless deluge of propaganda and by eliminating competing narratives, the Nationalists excluded the war’s losers from the body politic, and more...
importantly from the national fold. This effacement of the subjugated population’s traumatic experiences and memories led to a collective repression of those memories, but, some argue, it also may have paved the way for the eventual transition to democracy in the late 1970s.

It is not as if the war had been forgotten, of course. In fact, Spaniards were reminded of the war continuously, but only insofar as it had affected the Nationalists. How close the “Reds” had come to destroying the essence of Spanish unity and its moral fiber was beaten into public consciousness through a barrage of propaganda in newspapers, films, radio broadcasts, sermons, and school lessons. Public recognition of and mourning for the war’s Nationalist victims were on display in churches, which exhibited plaques at their entrances listing those who had “fallen for God and Country.” Monuments such as the famously behemoth mausoleum Valle de los Caidos (Valley of the Fallen) dotted the country, glorifying the Nationalist war dead while negating the existence of Republican dead.

The purposeful public forgetting of Republican casualties, survivors, and those whose family members had connections to the war certainly added to the shock that the defeated had already experienced. Their trauma intensified because of their inability to mourn in the usual ways. Republicans risked physical and economic punishment if they tried to mourn publicly for family members who had died in battle or who had been executed. Republican veterans were denied pensions, and wounded veterans could not collect disability payments, thus losing their ability to support themselves or their families; war widows and orphans could not obtain their husbands’ or fathers’ death benefits. Because the deaths of numerous soldiers and civilians remained unrecorded well into the 1970s, women, especially, were unable to remarry or receive other benefits because death certificates for their late husbands did not exist.

It was not enough to wage war on those on the wrong side of the internecine struggle. Their descendants required purification also. Not only did the victors wrest small children from female prisoners for religious training and what was termed “de-Marxification,” but it has also recently come to light that doctors, nuns, and government officials conspired to steal babies from those deemed socially undesirable.

Beginning in 1939 and possibly continuing until as recently as 1990, stolen babies...
were given or sold to “worthier” guardians who would raise the children as patriotic Spaniards, free of the taint of Marxism, atheism, and regional nationalisms. These accomplices in baby trafficking informed women who had just given birth that their children had died. False graves were created to carry on the illusion. Members of the ruling classes raised the children, who never knew they were adopted. There are estimates that 30,000 babies were stolen between 1939 and 1950, and totals may have reached as high as 300,000 by 1990.49

Why did so few successfully resist this multi-pronged repression between 1939 and 1975? Within Spain, the reasons for failure ought to be obvious by now.50 Outside of Spain, the answer is much less satisfying. After 1939, exiled Republicans and Republicans-in-hiding tried to topple the recently enconced Nationalists by employing a combination of back-door diplomacy and guerrilla and proxy warfare. And once World War II began, vanquished Spaniards saw the possibility that an Allied victory could result in a much better peace settlement for Spain. After the war ended, the Allies paid lip service to punishing the Franco regime for its fascistic tendencies and its support for the Axis powers, but in the end they did little to chasten Spain beyond treating it (briefly) as a pariah state. That outcome dashed Republican hopes for a new government and a humane amnesty. The Cold War paradigm that dogged the United States and Western Europe soon after 1945 helped Franco elude the punishment imposed on the official Axis powers. Franco could claim that the


50 I have argued throughout this essay that the shock of the initial war and terror laid the foundation for compliance among the general population over the entire span of the Franco years. Certainly there was opposition to the Franco regime during these decades, as chronicled in the works of Javier Tusell, La oposición democrática al franquismo (Barcelona, 2012); Javier Tusell, Alicia Alted, and Abdón Mateos, eds., La oposición al régimen de franco: Estado de la cuestión y metodología de la investigación (Madrid, 1990), among many others, and sometimes it burst out during the 1960s and 1970s, especially as worldwide activist movements also exploded onto the world stage. But the resistance was ineffective during the years of the dictatorship. I also do not mean to imply that everybody feared the regime and the institutional henchmen of the military and the Church. Recent historiography attempts to account for what some have seen as the population’s satisfaction with the regime. For the idea that the Franco regime’s longevity arose from its adaptability from the 1950s on, see Townson, Spain Transformed, especially the chapter by Edward Malefakis, “The Franco Dictatorship: A Bifurcated Regime?,” 248–254. Cazorla Sánchez argues that the regime’s “repressive” institutions created a population that was “pessimistic in social and collective matters,” contributing to an apathy in politics and a certain belief that “life had actually improved under Franco.” “The social and economic changes that took place in the latter years of the dictatorship have led many people . . . to believe that Francoism was the basis for the country’s successful transition into a modern nation . . . [But] exactly the opposite is true . . . Franco’s apologists also forget that the ‘economic miracle’ was made possible only by the extraordinary exploitation and sacrifice of ordinary Spaniards.” Fear and Progress, 4, 18, 14–15.
Nationalists had always opposed the communists, that they had fought the civil war expressly to prevent the Red tide. In 1953, the U.S. established economic and political relations with the Franco regime, thereby propping up the Spanish economy and ensuring Franco’s survival. Seemingly, then, the only response to these collective horrors was silence and waiting.

Franco finally died in 1975. The possibility that the war of occupation could publicly end appeared near. During Spain’s transition to democracy, political elites from a variety of parties, including opposition parties outlawed under Franco, created among themselves what has subsequently been called “the Pact of Forgetting.” As traditionally told, political elites and Spanish citizens who had lived through the war or who had suffered under the repression feared a return to the fractiousness of the Republic and civil war. Under this agreement, they would avoid more fratricide. The traditional Francoist parties would move toward a process of democratization and the creation of a constitution; more importantly, no one would be prosecuted for war and political crimes committed between 1936 and 1977. Under the 1977 Amnesty Law, there would be no military tribunals, no truth and reconciliation processes, and no purges of the sort the world has been accustomed to seeing under other military dictatorships and wars since the 1980s.

The years immediately following Franco’s death witnessed the kinds of political violence and social turmoil reminiscent of the pre–civil war years. The threat of more political violence loomed on the eve of the transition. So it is no wonder that 61 percent of the Spanish population approved

51 This was known as the Pact of Madrid.


53 Encarnación writes: “Fueling fears and uncertainty about the future was the very violent context in which democratization unfolded in Spain, which belies the country’s reputation as a case study of moderation during the transition to democracy. In fact, violence was more pervasive in post-Franco Spain than in revolutionary Portugal, where the transition to democracy . . . witnessed workers’ rebellions and land seizures not seen in Western Europe since the Spanish Civil War.” Moreover, “Between 1975 and 1980, more than 460 violent deaths for political purposes were registered and about 400 people died in right-wing and left-wing terrorist acts.” Encarnación, “Reconciliation after Democratization,” 440.
of such a comprehensive amnesty immediately after Franco’s death, making the Pact of Forgetting workable. The pact held for almost three decades, paving the way for a relatively peaceful transition to democracy, but this did not mean that people forgot the trauma of the war and the protracted repression. As historian Santos Juliá argues, people often confuse amnesty with amnesia. Reams of paper have been filled with tales of wartime and postwar atrocities. Nobody has forgotten, but the crimes have been forgiven . . . publicly.

And herein lies the tension. Publicly, bygones have been considered bygones, as long as democratic institutions flourished and the economy soared. Old enemies were incorporated into the nation once more. But privately, memories of the war and its aftermath continued to fester. Private citizens could not attain justice for their loved ones, and as generations from that war began to die off, the absence of justice for the Republican war victims and their relatives felt to them much like forgetfulness.

Only in the 1990s did private citizens (mostly from the left) take it upon themselves to work through their private memories in a more public forum. What began in the 1990s as a trickle of interest in trying to find and exhume the bodies of relatives in unmarked mass graves for burial in family plots became a flood of indignation as more and more people demanded justice for their relatives’ wrongful deaths. In 2000, Emilio Silva founded the Association for the Recovery of Historical Memory (ARMH), a non-profit organization that employs scientists, archaeologists, and historians to locate and exhume the remains of Republican victims killed and buried in mass graves. ARMH aimed to bring justice to the war’s victims and closure to the dead’s relatives. ARMH and other historical memory associations began to ask for


56 The jury is still out on whether such things as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions actually work to heal the traumatic wounds that come from wars and dictatorships. See, for example, Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York, 2011); David Mendeloff, “Trauma and Vengeance: Assessing the Psychological and Emotional Effects of Post-Conflict Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 3 (2009): 592–623.

57 Applying concepts derived from Sigmund Freud, Dominick LaCapra makes a distinction between acting out and working through historical traumas: “Acting-out is related to repetition, and even the repetition-compulsion—the tendency to repeat something compulsively. This is very clear in the case of people who undergo a trauma. They have a tendency to relive the past, to exist in the present as if they were still fully in the past, with no distance from it.” Working through implies that “the person tries to gain critical distance on a problem, to be able to distinguish between past, present and future. For the victim, this means his ability to say to himself, ‘Yes, that happened to me back then. It was distressing, overwhelming, perhaps I can’t entirely disengage myself from it, but I’m existing here and now, and this is different from back then.’” “‘Acting-Out’ and ‘Working-Through’ Trauma,” excerpt from interview with LaCapra by Amos Goldberg, Jerusalem, June 9, 1998, http://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Micro soft%20Word%20-%20%203646.pdf. See also Saul Friedlander, “Trauma, Transference and ‘Working Through’ in Writing the History of the Shoah,” History and Memory 4, no. 1 (1992): 39–59; and Dominick LaCapra, “Trauma, Absence, Loss,” Critical Inquiry 25, no. 4 (1999): 696–727.

58 ARMH’s website is http://memoriahistorica.org.es. To understand some of the issues at stake once mass graves were exhumed, see Layla Renshaw, Exhuming Loss: Memory, Materiality and Mass Graves of the Spanish Civil War (Walnut Creek, Calif., 2011).
state aid to finance these exhumations, but leaders of the Popular Party such as José María Aznar accused the left of conjuring up the civil war’s ghosts and creating much unnecessary discord.\(^59\) Tempers flared so much that by 2006, in what became known as “the War of the Death Notices,” relatives of those killed on both sides began competing for newspaper space to take out long-delayed obituaries describing how and when the victims died, thus moving the war to a more symbolic space. Next, in what many attacked as yet another game of politics to stir up long-buried resentments, the socialists, under the leadership of José Luis Zapatero, passed the Law of Historical Memory in 2007.\(^60\) This law included such measures as employing the Ministry of Justice to collect evidence about wartime atrocities, financing the “exhumation and reburial” of people currently in unmarked graves, and creating a Documentary Center for Historical Memory. At the same time, the one-sided memorial program of the Franco regime was attenuated by eliminating plaques and statues “that exalt one of the warring bands.”\(^61\) Finally, the civil war wounds bled onto the world’s stage again in October 2008, when the Spanish jurist, Baltasar Garzón, broke with the 1977 Amnesty Law by seeking the location of some 130,000 people still unaccounted for from the war and postwar dictatorship and by pursuing those responsible for crimes committed during this same period.\(^62\) This action proved too much for the far right, who took him to court and managed to get him disbarred for eleven years, rendering him legally impotent.\(^63\)

So what accounts for this memory explosion nearly thirty years after Franco’s death, especially when a majority of Spaniards opted for amnesty as a way to smooth the transition to a democratic state and to heal the wounds of the long civil war? Some say that the election of Aznar’s government in 1996 and the further rightward turn after the 2000 elections, when the Popular Party began to amplify a “neo-Francoist nationalism,” opened up old wounds that had begun healing.\(^64\) Perhaps the most compelling argument for the return of Spain’s “lost” memory comes from trauma centered in another place, as Omar G. Encarnación argues, namely, in Augusto Pinochet’s Chile.\(^65\) In 1996, Garzón opened up a case against Pinochet for

\(^{59}\) On the other hand, Aznar had no problem paying millions of euros to Russia “to exhume and repatriate from Russia the corpses of several Spanish volunteers from the Blue Division, the battalion sent by Franco to buttress Nazi troops during World War II in support of Adolf Hitler.” Encarnación, “Pinochet’s Revenge,” 42.

\(^{60}\) Interestingly enough, days after this law passed, the Vatican beatified 498 Roman Catholics who had been killed by Republicans. Ibid., 47.

\(^{61}\) Ibid.

\(^{62}\) The assumption is that only Nationalist crimes would be investigated. Cazorla-Sánchez, “Revisiting the Legacy of the Spanish Civil War,” 239–240.


\(^{64}\) Cazorla-Sánchez, “Revisiting the Legacy of the Spanish Civil War,” 237–238.

\(^{65}\) Pinochet was the only head of state to appear at Franco’s funeral and one of his most fervent admirers. Pinochet supposedly modeled his terror state on Franco’s. Encarnación, “Pinochet’s Revenge,” 42.
the deaths of fifty Spanish citizens living in Chile during the coup. In 1998, Pinochet was arrested in London, and Garzón requested his extradition to Spain in order to stand trial for crimes against humanity. This act galvanized Spanish and Chilean citizens to reflect on their respective traumas and memories. Many Chileans resented the Spanish interference and wondered why Spaniards should decide the punishment for Chile’s criminal when they had not even punished their own. For Spanish citizens, but not Spanish politicians, Pinochet’s arrest and potential extradition became a proxy trial for Franco’s crimes, and it was this fervor for proxy justice that fanned the flames of civil war remembrance among private citizens again.

Obviously, how the civil war should be remembered has not been settled. Meanwhile, mourning and remembrance of the war now remain in the hands of victims’ relatives from both sides of the conflict, and politicians continue to use the memory of the civil war to distract the population from the very real but different economic problems that Spain faces today. Spain’s contemporary economic woes have opened up some of the war’s old wounds, at least rhetorically.

The conditions that provided the catalyst for civil war have mostly disappeared, and the war’s protagonists are almost all dead, so I think we can safely say that the Spanish Civil War ended by the time of Franco’s death. But it took much more than an unconditional surrender to terminate the violence and settle the disagreements that began the war. The Spanish Civil War demonstrates that although a war might be officially over, the violent purging designed to maintain the victors’ power and legitimacy can prolong a civil war for decades and transform it into another kind of warfare altogether. If we look at the Franco dictatorship as a war of occupation, then the scale of terror makes more sense: it is much easier to persecute a population if you perceive them as both foreign and inimical to your way of life than if you view your enemies as fellow citizens who happen to have ideological differences with you but who share the same communal or national bonds. Under Franco, the vanquished remained existential threats. Therefore, it took his death to begin the process of psychological recovery from the war’s atrocities.

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66 His call for Pinochet’s extradition was probably aided by the emergence and growth of the International Human Rights movement from the 1980s on.
67 Prime Minister Aznar, whose father and grandfather served in the government of the Franco regime, certainly did not want Pinochet extradited or to have the crimes of the Franco regime reexamined, but neither did the former socialist prime minister, Felipe González. Encarnación, “Pinochet’s Revenge,” 41.
The violence is over, and now only competing memories remain. Saul Friedlander has said, “at the individual level, a redemptive closure . . . desirable as it would be, seems largely impossible . . . [I]f we make allowance for some sort of ritualized form of commemoration, already in place, we may foresee, in the public domain, a tendency towards closure without resolution, but closure nonetheless.”

Although Friedlander wrote about working through the Holocaust, citizens of Spain might also heed this advice. If Spain can authentically work through its civil war past and recognize the trauma inflicted on all people by employing grave exhumations, DNA matching, historical education, and monuments dedicated to real reconciliation, then perhaps time will not render the horrors of this civil war lighter than air.

Memories seem to be one of the few things accessible right now. Recently there have been protests by Spanish historians over the fact that the minister of defense tried in 2010 to prevent the declassification of some 10,000 military documents related to diplomacy and foreign affairs. After people lodged complaints in major newspapers, the documents in question were moved with some secrecy from the foreign affairs archive (Archivo de Asuntos Exteriores) in Madrid to the archives dealing with general administration in Alcalá de Henares (Archivo General de la Administración [AGA]). The AGA contains materials pertaining to government administration, mostly from 1939 on, and there are too many materials there for the skeletal staff to handle and classify. Therefore, these materials will essentially be lost in the giant black hole of paper that is the AGA. Historians have begun mounting protests against this recent action. Eduardo del Campo, “El búnker de la historia de España,” El Mundo, May 6, 2013, http://www.elmundo.es/accesible/elmundo/2013/05/06/cultura/1367824921.html; Carlos Sanz Díaz, “Documentación histórica,” El País, May 15, 2013, http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/05/14/opinion/1368553901_384039.html.

Friedlander, “Trauma, Transference and ‘Working Through’ in Writing the History of the Shoah,” 54.

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